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INTRODUCTION
The interplay between market forces and legal compulsion is as old as
the Code of Ur-Nammu, yet the financial incentives for social conformity
have never been more patent. In what may be its most ambitious effort yet,
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) recently launched
the International Standard ISO 26000:2010 (ISO 26000) on social responsi-
bility (SR), a new voluntary standard providing guidance to any
• Deputy Legal Adviser, International Labour Organization (ILO), Geneva, Switzer-
land. This Article was prepared in the Author's personal capacity and does not represent the
policy or opinions of the ILO or the International Labour Office. The Author is grateful for the
documentary and factual contributions of Emily Sims of the ILO.
1. The Code of Ur-Nammu, a law code written on a tablet in the Sumerian language
around 2100-2050 B.C., institutes monetary fines for bodily injury. Its market-based approach
contrasted with the principle of lex talionis (eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth) used in Babylo-
nian law to impose a punishment identical to the offense. SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER, THE
SUMERIANS: THEIR HISTORY, CULTURE AND CHARACTER 84-85 (1963).
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organization on good practices in SR.2 ISO 26000 provides wide-ranging
guidance on areas of social and environmental conduct that are relevant to
public policy and regulation. The single ISO-branded package offers a new
product that markets publicly developed legal norms for commercial use. It
operates through a system of voluntary compliance based on market reputa-
tion for SR and is largely delinked from public regulatory mechanisms.
3
This Article explores the emerging role of private international stand-
ardization in addressing, on a global scale, public interests and issues
traditionally addressed through international public law and policy. It
assesses the advantages and limitations of such private action, using the de-
velopment and launch of ISO 26000 as an example. The Article assesses the
purpose for and process of developing ISO 26000. It reviews the factors that
motivated ISO's decision to develop such a standard and examines the
search for legitimacy and accountability in the "multistakeholder" process
leading to its final submission to ISO member bodies for a vote. The analy-
sis focuses in particular on the interaction between private and public actors,
including governments and international organizations, and specifically on
ISO's cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO), the
specialized U.N. agency whose mandate is to establish and supervise inter-
national labor standards, one of the subjects with which ISO 26000 was
integrally concerned.
The Article posits that, where matters of public interest and policy are
concerned, more deliberate coordination should guide the interaction be-
tween private standardization regimes and public international governance
structures to ensure that the actions in both spheres are consistent with the
2. International Organization for Standardization [ISO], ISO 26000: Guidance on So-
cial Responsibility, Ref. No. ISO 26000:2010(E) (2010). The name ISO derives from the
Greek word isos, meaning "equal." The acronym is used as a name of the organization in all
languages. Discover ISO: ISO's Name, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/discover-isoisos-
name.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). The object of the organization, devised in a 1946 meeting
of delegates of national standards bodies from twenty-five countries in London, was "to facili-
tate the international coordination and unification of industrial standards." Discover ISO:
ISO's Origins, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/discover-iso-isos-originshtm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2012). Although ISO standards are voluntary in principle, in practice they may accrue
a compulsory market effect if they become widely accepted by the industry concerned. Dis-
cover ISO: The ISO Brand, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/aboutldiscover-iso-the-iso-brand.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
3. ISO standards are branded as voluntary, market driven, and based on consensus
among experts in the field. Discover ISO: The ISO Brand, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/
about/discover-isothe-iso-brand.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). Most ISO standards are
purchased by companies for their unique technical content so that they can obtain third-
party assessment and certification of their conformity with the standard in order to gain
access to, or become more competitive in, the global marketplace. Discover ISO: Why
Conformity Assessment Is hnportant, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/discover-iso-why-
conformity-assessment-is-important.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012); What Is Conformity
Assessment?, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/resources/conformity-assessment/what is
conformity-assessment.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). In contrast, ISO 26000 is derived and
adapted from policy instruments and norms already developed in public international law that
serve as the basis for public compliance and oversight mechanisms.
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respective rights and duties of the actors involved and effectively promote
social and economic progress. This Article proposes that a "Protocol of
Good Practice" be developed, using existing international rules and policies,
to govern the conduct of private actors and clarify their responsibility for the
effects of their conduct in the public sphere. Elements for such an instru-
ment can be found in international human rights and trade law and draw on
the recognized duties of private actors and the responsibilities of govern-
ments under international and domestic law. The proposed starting point is a
principle of coordination for organizing private standardization in relation to
public policy fields, which includes ways of determining the priorities to be
given to already-initiated public action and of avoiding conflict in the exer-
cise of private mandates and action to give effect to private standards. This
approach builds on the comparative advantages of public and private action
and encourages complementarity between the two spheres as necessary for
effective action in line with the rights and duties of public and private actors
under international law. The proposals remain to be tested.
I. THE PATH TOWARD AN ISO STANDARD
ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The decision to develop ISO 26000 moved ISO far beyond its tradition-
al focus on the technical standards that, as a private organization,4 it
establishes for particular goods and services in order to address market
needs and facilitate international trade and business activity. ISO has pub-
lished more than 16,000 international standards, most of which address
narrow technical or scientific market needs targeting particular industries.
Less numerous but highly visible are ISO's management systems standards
for quality assurance systems (9000 Series) and environmental management
systems (14000 Series); third-party certification is among the mechanisms
used for assessing conformity with two of the major standards in these
4. ISO itself is not a public organization. It is a membership organization comprising
national standards institutes from more than 150 countries, with one member per country.
Discover ISO: Who Can Join ISO, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/discover-isowho-can-
join-iso.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Who Can Join ISO]. ISO currently operates
with 162 members and a Central Secretariat in Geneva. ISO Members, ISO,
http://www.iso.org/iso/about/isomembers.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) [hereinafter ISO
Members]; Governance and Operations, ISO, http:/Iwww.iso.org/iso/about/govemance
and-operations.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). The members are not delegates of national
governments, but may be part of the governmental structure of their own countries or operate
subject to governmental mandates; other members are from the private sector and are estab-
lished by national partnerships of industry associations. See Who Can Join ISO, supra; ISO
Members, supra. The ISO Statutes and Rules of Procedure govern the organization and are
"ratified" by its members. ISO, ISO STATUTES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE (14th ed. 2000).
For regulatory matters not addressed in the ISO Statutes and Rules of Procedure, the law of
the country in which ISO has its seat applies. Id. art. 22.
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series, ISO 9001 and ISO 14001.' Both the 9000 and 14000 series apply to
all organizations, not just specific industries, although a number of applica-
tions to specific sectors have recently evolved.6 In other situations, where
the subject to be addressed is deemed insufficiently mature or too controver-
sial to be developed into an ISO international standard, ISO typically opts
instead to develop reports and other products that, unlike international
standards, are not exclusive and compete by offering different technical so-
lutions.7
ISO 26000 is similar to ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 in that it is intended
for use by any organization. It differs, however, from those standards in sev-
eral important ways. ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 (and their specific
applications)' take a management system approach, and thus on their faces
remain content neutral as to the results achieved.9 ISO 26000, in contrast,
5. Although ISO is responsible for developing, maintaining, and publishing standards,
third-party certification is carried out independently of ISO by conformity-assessment bodies
controlled by national authorities. These bodies are particularly active in industrialized re-
gions of the world; ISO and its partner, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC),
publish guides for conformity assessment activities. See ISO, ISO & CONFORMITY ASSESS-
MENT 4 (2005), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/casco-2005.pdf. In ISO's periodic survey
of the number and range of certificates, ISO 9001 was reported by ISO to have reached over
one million certifications in 2009, the vast majority of which were recorded in Europe and the
Far East (nearly eighty-five percent by 2009). See ISO, ISO SURVEY OF CERTIFIcATIONs 1
(2009), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/survey2009.pdf (charting growth and distribution
of certifications).
6. Certification standards have adapted ISO's management system approach to specif-
ic sectors or aspects thereof, including automotive, customer satisfaction, energy, food safety,
information security, health care, local government, medical devices, petroleum and gas, ship
recycling, and supply chain security; a risk management standard has also been applied specif-
ically, but is not a certification standard. Specific Applications, ISO, http://www.iso.orgl
iso/iso-catalogue/management-and-leadership-standards/specific-applications.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2012).
7. See Schematic Representation of ISO Deliverables, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/
standards-development/processes-and-procedures/deliverables/deliverables-schema-2.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2012). Where more than one technical solution may be capable of being
adopted, the nonexclusive proposals are left open to competition so long as there is no conflict
with existing ISO standards. Examples include publicly available specifications (PAS) and
technical specifications (TS). ISO/PAS Publicly Available Specification, ISO,
http://www.iso.org/iso/standards-development/processes-and-procedures/deliverables/iso-pas
_deliverable.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012); ISO/ITS Technical Specification, ISO,
http://www.iso.org/iso/standards-development/processes-and-procedures/deliverables/iso- ts_
deliverable.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). International workshop agreements (IWAs) are
intermediate technical specifications that essentially operate as normative documents in the
marketplace but may evolve into de facto standards and later be transformed into ISO stand-
ards. International Workshop Agreement, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/standards-development/
processes-and-procedures/deliverables/iso iwa deliverable.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
8. See supra note 6.
9. Although the literal requirements of the standards may be content neutral, the indi-
rect impact of the ISO 14000 series on regulatory levels of environmental standards has been
the subject of much debate. ILO, Overview of Global Developments and Office Activities Con-
cerning Codes of Conduct, Social Labelling and Other Private Sector Initiatives Addressing
[Vol. 33:481
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prescribes both process- and results-based objectives for organizational con-
duct. These objectives span a wide variety of subjects essential to public
life-human rights, labor practices, the environment, fair operating practic-
es, consumer protection, and community involvement and development. In
addition, ISO 26000, like all ISO standards, is for sale: companies and
others purchase ISO standards to become more competitive in the global
marketplace, in many cases by obtaining third-party certification of their
compliance with a standard.' 0 Nonetheless, ISO 26000 is expressly intended
for guidance only and not for certification, unlike the 9001 and 14001
standards." The lack of certification may render ISO 26000's effects on
market actors less immediately evident. In practice, ISO 26000 could either
compromise regulatory standards by generating market competition that
lowers the expectation for acceptable social behavior below the universal
minimum threshold set by governments through international legal stand-
ards, or complement them by encouraging socially responsible conduct
beyond what is legally required. For example, if private standards set the
minimum age for child labor below that fixed by international treaties and
legislation, they will reinforce the motivation to hire underage workers; if
private standards fix the age higher than that required by law, they might en-
courage an upward age limit.
ISO 26000 thus represents a new generation of international private
standardization initiatives that thrusts the private sphere into a more orga-
nized and direct commerce with public policy matters typically subject to
public law and regulation. The standard also heralds a pioneering innovation
in the manner of approaching private sector duties, including those of busi-
nesses and other organizations. Previously, individual private voluntary
initiatives, notably in corporate social responsibility (CSR), comprised a rel-
atively informal market, each initiative seeking to enhance companies'
market reputation by satisfying codes, social labels, or other initiatives
based on diverse combinations of legal norms, industry standards, and per-
sonal values.' 2 Now, the widespread use of a single one-size-fits-all private
Labour Issues, 24, ILO Doc. GB.273/WP/SDL/I(Rev. 1) (Nov. 1998) [hereinafter Codes of
Conduct Overview], available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relmgb/docs/
gb273/sdl-l.htm.
10. See, e.g., ISO 9001-Quality Management Standard, ISOQAR, http://www.isoqar.
com/iso9001/qualintro.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (offering accreditation and stating that
ISO 9001 certification "gives a competitive edge to an organisation's marketing").
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. In the ISO family of standards, there are
two general types of standards: recommendations or guidance standards, and the more well-
known requirements standards, for which certification is possible. According to the ILO,
"[e]nterprises on a world-wide scale have sought third-party certification of conformity" with
ISO standards, especially the management systems standards, "but some enterprises in devel-
oping countries have reported limitations in access to recognized certification services." Codes
of Conduct Overview, supra note 9, 24.
12. See Codes of Conduct Overview, supra note 9, 10-12. There is no single defini-
tion of corporate social responsibility (CSR); however, the term generally implies a form of
Spring 2012]
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international standard poses the risk of guiding private actors in a manner as
yet uncoordinated with public regulation on matters of compelling public
interest.
II. THE DECISION TO DEVELOP AN ISO STANDARD
ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
This Article's analysis starts with ISO's expansion of its management
systems standards into "management and leadership standards," launched
principally through ISO 26000. This point of departure marks a notable
shift in focus for ISO; in general, private standardization pursues goals of
a technical and objective nature, rather than assessing publicly recognized
standards related to governance, development, and human rights, as ISO
26000 does.13
In 2005, ISO 26000 was conceived as a proposal for a "guidance stand-
ard" applicable to all organizations. Following the usual procedure, the new
work item proposal (NWIP) received an affirmative vote by ISO member
bodies.14 Choosing to use a guidance standard rather than a certification
standard 15 marked a distinctive step forward from a decade earlier. In 1996,
a Swiss nongovernmental organization (NGO), Bread for All, suggested
adopting a social management standards series, a proposal that ISO did not
then endorse.16 At the time, voluntary private initiatives in SR were emerg-
ing in diverse forms and content (for example, in company codes of
conduct, social labels, and investor initiatives).' 7 Accreditation organizations
and auditing firms sought to capitalize on this market by offering services
for verifying responsible conduct, focusing especially on management
systems. Indeed, growing "[e]vidence suggest[ed] that companies with
self-regulation by businesses voluntarily taking levels of responsibility for the impact of their
activities beyond that legally required. See id.
13. See infra Parts V-VI; see also Management and Leadership Standards, ISO,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso-catalogue/management and-leadership-standards.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2012).
14. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. In general, ISO members decide to
develop new standards by voting on a proposal typically developed by ISO national members
themselves at the request of specific sectors of business or industry. For nontechnical and
cross-sectoral matters, three ISO policy development committees provide guidance. How ISO
Develops Standards, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/how iso develops-standards.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2012). The idea that evolved into ISO 26000 was initially discussed in the
Committee on Consumer Policy (COPOLCO) as a matter relevant to consumers' views. What
COPOLCO Does, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/resources/resources consumers/what copolco-
does.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2012). The Technical Management Board (TMB) designated
that the Swedish and Brazilian ISO member bodies should be proposed as project leaders
(Swedish Standards Institute [SIS] and Associaqho Brasileira de Normas Tdcnicas [ABNT]
respectively). See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
16. Codes of Conduct Overview, supra note 9, 25.
17. See, e.g., id. I 31 n.29, 68-93.
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well-functioning quality assurance management systems (including compli-
ance with the ISO 9000 series) also tend[ed] to have effective systems of
implementation for labour-related codes provisions." 18 Other standards sys-
tems of relevance to such outcomes included "financial accounting,
environmental accounting, and HSE [health, safety, and environment] man-
agement; ILO-recommended occupational health and safety management
systems; and environmental management standards of the ISO 14000 se-
ries." 19 Some nongovernmental entities sought to adapt an ISO-standards
approach to social standards for enterprise. A U.S.-based research institute,
the Council for Economic Priorities, launched a generic management system
standard for enterprise, with a third-party certification process, "Social Ac-
countability 8000" (SA8000), in the late 1990s. SA8000 was one of the first
standards to be explicitly based in part on ILO conventions and recommen-
dations and to be inspired by the generic ISO model for management
systems.
20
By the turn of the twenty-first century, as international legal norms and
guidelines became more commonly used as points of reference to define the
goals embedded in company codes and social labels, the disparate content of
initiatives became less pronounced. 21 The United Nations and other public
international organizations developed initiatives jointly with the private sec-
tor to encourage complementarity. The U.N. Secretary-General, for
example, developed the U.N. Global Compact to encourage businesses and
other stakeholders to align their ongoing activities with ten principles drawn
from internationally recognized human rights, labor, and environmental in-
struments of a legal and policy nature.2 The Global Reporting Initiative
18. Id. $ 63.
19. ld. ISO's various management systems "share[d] basic steps in common, including
setting a clear and detailed enterprise policy, allocating managerial resources for effective dis-
semination of the policy (including translation), developing and implementing tools for
monitoring, reporting, and taking corrective action, including training programmes." Id.
20. Unlike the ISO accreditation system that engages multiple national accreditation
bodies, SA8000 certification was offered only through an accreditation agency set up by the
Council for Economic Priorities working with private inspection enterprises that it accredited
under nonpublic criteria. See ISO, SA8000: Management System Standard for 'Social Ac-
countability,' at 13, ISO 9000 NEWS 5/1998 (1998). The accredited agencies themselves
were not necessarily certified as in compliance with SA8000. Id.
21. See, e.g., Amy Lehr, Old and New Governance Approaches to Conflict Minerals:
All Are Better than One, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 148, 150-53 & n.2 (2010),
http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/l1/online_52 lehr/. The normative convergence evident
among the private rule-making efforts in the field of CSR has been hailed as an emerging "lex
mercatoria" symptomatic of a "new governance." Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PuB. POL'y 334, 341
(2009). For the earlier disparities in content, see Codes of Conduct Overview, supra note 9,
46-59.
22. The U.N. Global Compact describes itself as "a strategic policy initiative for busi-
nesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally
accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption."
U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). For an
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(GRI)-which originated from a U.S. nonprofit organization, the Coalition
for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), and is now a key
collaborator with the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP)--established
an assessment framework for business responsibility as a public-private coa-
lition.2 3 The U.N. Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, a U.N. Charter-based body, undertook to codify human
rights "norms" for transnational and other businesses, 2 4 an effort that was
eventually superseded in 2011 by a framework of Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights intended to apply to all states and businesses,
regardless of type or size.
25
In 2001, ISO reported consumer concerns on what it termed the "social
integrity" of corporations' operations in the global marketplace.26 It then
launched a feasibility study and online forum on the value of CSR standards
through its Committee on Consumer Policy (COPOLCO).2 7 By 2004, a
annual fee, companies join the Global Compact and participate in exchanges of experience
with other companies and interested organizations, and have access to Global Compact's
management tools and resources. How to Participate, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/Business-Participation/index.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2012).
23. What Is GRI?, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE [GRI], https:/Iwww.
globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/what-is-GRI/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb.
26, 2012).
24. Comm. on Human Rights, Subcomm. on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, 55th Sess., Aug. 13, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/
12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
25. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Imple-
menting the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc.
AIHRC/17/31, Annex (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie).
26. Malaysian Ass'n of Standards Users, SR Background, MALAY. OFFICIAL HOMEPAGE
ON Soc. RESP. (Sept. 25, 2008, 10:35 AM), http://www.standardsusers.org/mysr/index.php?
option=com-content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=54. Although ISO has not defined the
term "social integrity," the later report of its Advisory Group expressed some concern that vol-
untary SR initiatives could actually act as a substitute for more meaningful actions or
responses and thereby delay more substantive progress on some issues. ISO ADVISORY GRP.
ON Soc. RESPONSIBILITY, WORKING REPORT ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 73 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter ADVISORY GROUP REPORT], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/
8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/3974906/ISOSR-AdvisoryGroup - Report.pdf?
nodeid=3978167&vemum=-2.
27. ISO Comm. on Consumer Policy COPOLCO Workshop, Port-of-Spain, Trin. & To-
bago, June 10, 2002, Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Solutions, CIF 02-062,
available at http://inni.pacinst.org/inni/corporate-social-responsibility/Proceedings-of-
COPOLCO-CSR-workshop-Trinidad-meeting.pdf; see also ISO Working Grp. on Soc. Re-
sponsibility [WGSR], Background, ISO, http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/
830949/3934883/3935096/07_gen-info/backg.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2010). In an excep-
tional step, internal preparatory documents of ISO 26000 were archived for public use. See
ISO WGSR, Committee 05. Working Area, ISO, http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?
func=ll&objld=3935837&objAction=browse&sort=name (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
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"multistakeholder" Advisory Group established by the ISO Technical Man-
agement Board (ISO/TMB) 21 issued an extensive report and final
recommendations in a non-consensus-based process. With a single dissent-
ing voice, the Advisory Group proposed a standard on "social
responsibility" rather than one on "CSR," subject to specific conditions rec-
ognizing that ISO did not have the authority or legitimacy to set social
obligations or expectations that are properly defined by governments and
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). 29 Although ISO rules emphasize
consensus decisions wherever possible, it is notable that this decision on a
fundamental new direction in ISO's standard setting was taken with a dis-
senting voice.
In a determinative step, the ISO/TMB concluded that "due to the com-
plexity and fast-evolving nature of the subject, it is not feasible to harmonize
substantive social responsibility commitments."30 The ISO/TMB resolution
followed the expanded scope first proposed by the Advisory Group and rec-
ommended an SR standard for all organizations rather than a standard
28. ISO/TMB Res. 35/2004 (June 24-25, 2004), available at http://isotc.iso.org/
livelink/livetink/fetch/2000/2t22/830949/3934883/3935096/02-news/resolution35.html; Press
Release, ISO, ISO Weighs Results of Conference on Social Responsibility (June 24, 2004),
http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref921. The fourteen-member Technical Man-
agement Board (ISO/TMB), advises the twenty-member ISO Council on organization,
coordination, strategic planning, and programming of ISO's technical work. ISO Council,
ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/structure/structurecouncil.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
Although the ISO Council controls the operations of ISO through its officers and twenty elect-
ed-member bodies, the ISO/TMB is responsible for all aspects of the technical work,
including liaising with other standardization bodies, examining proposals for new fields of
ISO activity, and establishing and dissolving technical committees. Technical Management
Board (TMB), ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/standards-development/governance of technical_
work/technicalmanagement-board.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). Overall strategic direction
of ISO is referred to voting members who meet for an annual General Assembly. General As-
sembly, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/structure/structure-ga.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2012).
29. The scope was expanded beyond business ostensibly to avoid capture of the new
standard as an accountability tool by NGOs. ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 26, at 68;
ISO, Recommendations to the ISO Technical Management Board, at 1, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB
AG CSR N 32 (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/-
8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/3974906/ISOSRAdvisoryGroup_-_Recommendations
to the ISO TechnicalManagementBoard.pdf?nodeid=4274012&vemum=-2. In a minori-
ty opinion, the World Wildlife Federation expressed concerns about the lack of clarity
regarding the value added to existing CSR initiatives, the absence of recognition of the im-
portance of environmental issues, the proposed scope beyond business, the necessity for more
diverse stakeholder engagement, and the need for transparency and public reporting on im-
plementation of any such ISO deliverable. Id. at 3-4.
30. ISO/TMB Res. 35/2004, supra note 28 (establishing an ISO/TMB task force to de-
velop a new work item proposal for the International Standard under specific conditions
including an agreement between ISO and the ILO to "govern cooperation between ISO and
ILO in the area of social responsibility"). The ISO/TMB resolution followed an ISO Confer-
ence on Social Responsibility held on June 21-22, 2004, which reported general consensus on
moving forward. Press Release, ISO, supra note 28.
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focused on CSR.31 The decision was predicated on "the pre-conditions stipu-
lated by the [Advisory Group] for ISO activity in the field of SR" that
"constitute a package. ' 32 In noting these preconditions, the ISO/TMB
acknowledged that SR involved a number of questions "qualitatively differ-
ent from [those] traditionally ... dealt with by ISO" and recognized the
"role of governments and intergovernmental organizations [in setting] social
obligations or expectations. '33 Although international instruments adopted
by IGOs were recognized, the ISO/TMB determined that "there is scope for
private voluntary initiatives in the field of SR" and supported developing an
agreement with ILO to govern cooperation between ISO and ILO in the area
of SR and to adjust ISO processes "where necessary to ensure meaningful
participation by the full range of interested parties.
34
III. THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING ISO 26000
In October 2004, ISO circulated to ISO member bodies for a vote an
NWIP on SR, recalling that the Advisory Group had deliberated about ISO's
potential involvement in the field of CSR.35 Drawing on the founding resolu-
tion of the ISO/TMB and the Advisory Group's work, the justification for a
new standard noted the "market confusion that may be caused by the steadi-
ly increasing number of SR initiatives," concluding that the "need is urgent"
and that an international standard "may encourage organizations that know
and have good experience with the ISO 'brand,' to operationalize their SR
commitments."36 The NWIP's goal was a document that was "flexible
enough to support current initiatives, conventions and tools as well as future
developments in this field. '37 The letter addressed to ISO members accom-
panying the NWIP noted that the ISO/TMB had recognized "that ISO will
be entering into a new area of standardization, in which it will need to en-
gage new groups of stakeholders," and had "decided that, the work would be
conducted in a working group directly under the responsibility of the TMB,"
which would "require some adaptation of ISO's normal working methods.
38
The NWIP stated that the International Standard should aim at providing




35. Letter from M.A. Smith, TMB Secretariat, ISO, to ISO Member Bodies (Oct. 7,
2004) (enclosing for voting the New Work Item Proposal-Social Responsibility with Annex-
es); ISO, New Work Item Proposal-Social Responsibility, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB N 26000 (Oct.
7, 2004), http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/-8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/
3974906/Newwork.item.proposal-_.SocialResponsibility.pdf?nodeid=3978057&vemum=-2
[hereinafter NWIP]. For the Advisory Group and founding resolution, see supra notes 26, 29-
30, and accompanying text.
36. NWIP, supra note 35, Annex B, §§ d-e.
37. Id. Annex B, § d.
38. Id. at 1.
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"guidance to enable an organization to formulate SR systems taking into ac-
count communication of stakeholders. It is not intended for certification
purpose [sic], or regulatory or contractual use."3 9 Nonetheless, the ISO/TMB
was obliged later to clarify that the standard was not to be a management
system standard.40 The NWIP notably oversimplified the Advisory Group's
approach by summarizing only that the Group's "indication that ISO should
address what is non-legal (leaving the legal issues to inter-governmental or-
ganizations) may not be helpful."41 Rather, in discussing issues that may
affect the feasibility of the standard setting, the Advisory Group Report it-
self had debated at some length about the capacity of ISO to undertake such
a process and whether its procedures were flexible enough to permit the
necessary reliance on the expertise of IGOs and others outside of national
standards bodies.
42
Following a positive vote on the NWIP by ISO members,4" the
ISO/TMB established a Working Group on Social Responsibility
(WGSR).' In the five-year drafting process that followed, the ISO WGSR
involved approximately 450 experts, including government representa-
tives, several hundred observers from nearly one hundred countries, and a
large number of IGOs and NGOs.45 ISO 26000's development brought with
it the search for legitimacy through representativity,46 fairness in operating
39. Id. Annex A, § 4.
40. ISO/TMB Res. 38/2005 (undated), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/
livelink/fetch/2000/2122/830949/3934883/3935096/02_news/Technical%20Management%
20Board%20resolution%2038.pdf.
41. NWIP, supra note 35, Annex B, § c (referring to the ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, Su-
pra note 26, at 86).
42. ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 26, at 84.
43. ISO/TMB, Table of Replies on the New Work Item Proposal Social Responsibility
ISO/TMB N 26000, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 7 (Feb. 25, 2005), available at
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=3974912&objAction=Open&vernum= 1.
Of the thirty-seven Participating members (P-members) replying, four voted "No" and twenty-
nine voted "Yes" to adding the new work item to ISO's agenda. Id. at 1-2. The member bodies
that expressly recognized the need for closer coordination with the ILO were from Canada,
Germany, Russia, and the United States. Id. at 6, 9, 14, 16; see also ISO WGSR, Salvador,
Braz., March 2005, Report of the Secretariat: First Meeting of lSO/TMB/WG Social Respon-
sibility, http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/-8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/
3973638/3973639/4243588/AnnexB%2CReport of the Secretariat.pdf?nodeid=4243699&
vernum=-2 (presenting voting results to the first meeting of the WGSR).
44. See ISO/TMB Res. 35/2004, supra note 28. The WGSR started its work by review-
ing comments of national member bodies and nominated experts on its organization of work.
See ISO, Proposal for the Organizational Structure of and Terms of Reference for the
ISOfTMB/WG Social Responsibility, at 4-5, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 3 (Jan. 20, 2005)
[hereinafter Proposal for Organizational Structure], available at http://isotc.iso.org/
livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=3974908&objAction=Open&vemum= 1.
45. ISO 26000 Project Overview, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso-catalogue/
management andjleadership-standards/social-responsibility/sr iso26000_overview.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2012).
46. See infra Part III.A.
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procedures, 47 coherence in normative interaction with internationally recog-
nized legal standards and guidance,48 and continuity in the postpublication
stage.
49
A. Question of Representativity
To address the broad swath of issues touching governmental and public
interests in the development of ISO 26000, ISO launched an elaborate sys-
tem for stakeholder participation5' in the process based on six stakeholder
categories: consumers; government; industry; labor; NGO; and services,
support, research, and others.51 This deliberate attempt to broaden participa-
tion in developing ISO 26000 beyond the usual participation of
governments, industry, and consumers was a response to the recognition of
the relatively narrow industrialized-country base of dominant ISO interests
and actors. Although the membership of ISO includes much of the world,
the actual influence held among ISO's members is weighted toward indus-
trializing and developed country members.52 Correspondent and subscriber
members, with less-than-full member-body status and fewer voting rights,
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. See infra Part III.C.
49. See infra Part III.D.
50. ISO 26000 Project Overview, supra note 45.
51. ISO WGSR, Guidance on Stakeholder Categories in the ISO/TMB/WG SR, at 1, ISO
Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 48 rev. 1 (Sept. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Guidance on Stakeholder Cate-
gories], available at http://www.iso.org/sites/ConsumersStandards/en/pdfINO48_revl.pdf. This
guidance recognized the "importance of ensuring balanced participation" and for that purpose
excluded those with "inherent conflict[s] of interest," such as "enterprises and other organiza-
tions that offer services related to standardization, including certification, registration,
accreditation and related consulting services (SRI services)." Id. at 1, 5. For the definition of
"labor," the WGSR used the definition of "workers' representatives" in ILO Convention No.
135 because this "definition provides the basis for an understanding at the international level
as to what constitute genuine workers' organizations . .. in any specific situation or country.
National standard bodies should invite the most representative workers' organization to nomi-
nate an expert." Id. at 6 (quoting ILO Convention No. 135 Concerning Protection and
Facilities to Be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking art. 3, adopted June
23, 1971, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C135). When in doubt, the
guidance suggested consulting the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) or ILO,
both of which were involved in the process. Id. For NGOs, the guidance recommended select-
ing only nonprofit associations with public interest objectives related to SR topics or any of its
component issues and requiring that sources of funding be revealed and in particular that
grants or membership dues from, or fee-based services to, for-profit entities "should not be a
significant proportion of an NGO's overall funding or compromise the autonomy of its gov-
ernance." Id. at 7.
52. The need to improve the participation of developing countries in ISO's processes is
addressed explicitly in the ISO Action Plan for Developing Countries 2005-2010. ISO, ISO




are almost entirely from developing countries. 3 Similarly, the great majority
of technical work, including formation of standards, is done by developed
country members that are more likely to have sufficient financial resources
to send groups of experts to meetings and support the experts' work on
standards.
5 4
At the international level, experts were appointed through ISO's mem-
bers, the national standards bodies (NSBs), on the basis of ISO-crafted
criteria. At the national level, the stakeholder categories were to be repre-
sented in so-called mirror committees, established by the national member
bodies, that were responsible for developing "national positions" on the
draft standard in its progressive phases, including the Committee Draft (CD)
or Draft International Standard (DIS). ISO member bodies were to transmit
the mirror committees' positions to ISO."5 At both levels, it was the ISO na-
tional member bodies that nominated the experts or other individuals in the
remaining stakeholder categories. 6 Thus, the quality of participation ulti-
mately relied on the way in which those selections were made by the NSBs.
It was this aspect of the process that was challenged in the end as ineffective
by the International Organization of Employers (IOE), representing a con-
stituent group of ILO. As the IOE noted, "the experts in the ISO/TMB
53. Id. (noting that developing countries are one hundred percent of subscriber mem-
bers and ninety-four percent of correspondent members). There are three categories of ISO
membership: member bodies, correspondent members, and subscriber members. Only a mem-
ber body, which is considered the national body "most representative of standardization in its
country," is entitled to participate and exercise full voting rights on any ISO technical commit-
tee or policy committee. Member Bodies, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso-members/
member bodies.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). For difficulties facing developing country en-
terprises in the context of various standards requirements, see generally World Trade Org.
[WTO] Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Background Paper by the Secretariat: Restric-
tive Trade Effects of Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment
Procedures, G/TBT/W/42 (Apr. 28, 1997).
54. See ILO Director-General, Report of the Director-General: Fifth Supplementary
Report: Collaboration Between the International Labour Organization and the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) Addendum: General Information on the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), [ 2-3 & nn.2-3, ILO Doc. GB.298/15/5 (Mar. 9,
2007) (observing that developing country members "held only 2 per cent of the secretariats of
all ISO technical committees, subcommittees and working groups").
55. ISO WGSR, Resolutions from the Third Meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, Lisbon, Por-
tugal 2006-05-15-19, Res. 10, ISO Doc. ISO/TMBIWG SR N 74 (May 19, 2006) [hereinafter
Third Meeting of the WGSR], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=
ll&objld=5332590&objAction=Open. The WGSR agreed on "the need to have active mirror
committees structured in accordance with the guidance provided by WG SR and authorize[d]
TG [Task Group] I to survey experts and NSBs concerning the operation of mirror commit-
tees." Id.
56. At the international level all ISO national member bodies were to nominate up to
six experts and six observers to the WGSR, and to make every reasonable effort to nominate
one from each of the six stakeholder categories, with limited exceptions permitted. ISO
WGSR, Operating Procedure on Registration of Experts and Observers, 11 , ISO Doc.
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 73 (May 19, 2006), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?
func=ll&objld=8217875&objAction=Open&vernum= 1.
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WGSR were selected by the ISO national standards bodies, in many cases
with little or no consultation with the stakeholder group they were selected
to represent. Indeed, experts were not even required to belong to the
stakeholder group they were supposedly representing."57 The resolutions of
the WGSR and ISOITMB meetings throughout the process similarly evi-
dence a preoccupation with the state of representation in the process.
Repeated calls were made through the process for identification of major or-
ganizations or groups missing from the process,58 and the need to increase
local legitimacy through stakeholder participation in the mirror committees
was stressed. 9
To assist in financing developing country participation, the ISO WGSR
set up a system for external donor financing through a trust fund, which re-
ceived contributions from a handful of governments and from another
handful of multinational companies.6" The financing mechanism early on
faced challenges in terms of the principles on which donations would be ac-
cepted and sponsorship would be implemented. The mechanism's stated
purpose was to "increase and broaden stakeholder involvement to ensure the
credibility and enable effective participation in the ISO 26000 standardiza-
57. Int'l Org. of Employers [IOE], IOE Position on the Final Draft International
Standard (FDIS) of the 1SO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility (Sept. 8, 2010), availa-
ble at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=3935837&objAction=browse&
sort=name (included in file titled "x Comments received on ISO FDIS 26000.zip").
58. ISO WGSR, Resolutions from the Second Meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, Bangkok,
Thailand 2005-09-26-30, Res. 7, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 50 (Sept. 30, 2005) [herein-
after Second Meeting of the WGSR], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=
ll&objld=4545341&objAction=Open.
59. The WGSR repeatedly recalled the need for participation of different stakeholders
at the national level in order to increase "local legitimacy of the ISO SR process for the subse-
quent implementation of the standard," as a lack of sufficient participation of all stakeholder
categories was a persistent problem. ISO WGSR, Survey on ISO 26000 Mirror Committees, at
1, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 78 (undated) [hereinafter Survey on ISO 26000 Mirror
Committees], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=577321 I&
objAction=Open; see also ISO WGSR, Resolutions from the 5th Meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR,
Vienna, Austria, 2007-11-05-09, Res. 9, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 132 (Nov. 9, 2007)
[hereinafter 5th Meeting of the WGSR], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?
func=ll&objld=6936335&objAction=Open; ISO WGSR, Resolutions from the 7th meeting of
ISO/FMB/WG SR, Quebec, Canada, 2009-05-18-22, Res. 8, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N
170 (May 23, 2009), available at http://isotc.iso.orglivelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=
8157452&objAction=Open. Along with its national consensus position, each ISO member
body was requested to submit a list of the stakeholder groups that participated in developing
the national position, explaining why one or more stakeholder categories did not participate,
and (where it existed) transmit any substantive opposition from national stakeholder groups,
detailing the reason for the opposition. ISO, ISO/TMB/WG SR Operating Procedure Providing
Guidance on National Input to the WG SR, at 2, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 131 rev I
(Sept. 5, 2008) [hereinafter WGSR Guidance on National Input], available at
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=8217889&objAction=Open.




tion in the development of the SR standard"61 and "to fund involvement of
under-represented stakeholders from developed and developing countries."62
The operating principles of the fund emphasized diversity, independence,
and transparency in receiving and recognizing donations, and a special pro-
cedure was instituted to decide on acceptability of donations over $10,000.63
The principles of sponsorship gave priority to prespecified stakeholder cate-
gories addressing the problem of underrepresented categories and regions,
and a screening process and criteria were put in place to seek balance, con-
tinuity, and value of contribution among those who received the funds. 6' The
donors were publicly and repeatedly thanked.65
B. Operational Issues
1. Operating Structures
The leadership structures and operating procedures of the working
group that developed ISO 26000 were influential in determining the scope
and content of the Final Draft International Standard (FDIS). A hybrid sys-
tem of appointment and election existed, but appointment was the rule for
the most influential positions.66 The ISO/TMB itself appointed the Chairs of
61. ISO, ISO/TMB/WG ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: SR TRUST FUND § 2.1 (2006)
[hereinafter SR TRUST FUND], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=
ll&objld=5732558&objAction=Open.
62. Third Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 55, Res. 8.
63. SR TRUST FUND, supra note 61, §§ 2.2-6.
64. Id. §§ 3.1-.4.
65. Donors thanked in 2006 included the Finnish Government, Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
(NORAD), Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (JISC), Swiss State Secretariat on Eco-
nomic Affairs (SECO), Austrian Development Agency (ADA), and others. Third Meeting of
the WGSR, supra note 55, Res. 7. By 2007, mention of thanks included companies: Novo
Nordisk A/S and Suzano Papel e Celulose SA (whose representative was the Chair of the
WGSR). ISO WGSR, Resolutions from the 4th Meeting of ISO/FMB/WG SR, Sydney, Austral-
ia, 2007-01-29-2007-02-02, Res. 6, ISO Doc. ISO/TMBIWG SR N 107 (Feb. 2, 2007)
[hereinafter 4th Meeting of the WGSR], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/
livelink?func=ll&objld=6161021&objAction=Open. Later that year, other companies were
noted-namely Petrobras and SONY-as well as the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. 5th
Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 59, Res. 5. In 2008, the Standards Council of Canada was
thanked for contributing to the Trust Fund. ISO WGSR, Resolutions from the 6th Meeting of
ISOfTMB/WG SR, Santiago, Chile, 2008-09-01-05, Res. 12, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N
154 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=
7571477&objAction=Open.
66. See, e.g., ISO, PARTICIPATING IN THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 26000
ON' SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.3 (2006), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelinkflivelink/
fetch/-8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/3974906/Participatingin the futureItternational_
Standard ISO 26000 onSocialResponsibility.pdf?nodeid=5286037&vernum=-
2 ("TMB
... assigned the leadership of the working group collectively to Brazil (ABNT) and Sweden
(SIS)."); ISO WGSR, Selection Process for TG Leadership, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 46
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the WGSR, which consisted of a "twinned" leadership between developing
and developed countries.6 7 For the second-highest positions, the WGSR
Secretariat issued calls for nominations of task group leaders that included
qualification criteria, but there was no transparency in the review of
nominations.68 After the publication of ISO 26000, the "twinned approach"
to leadership, done on a selective basis, survived as ISO's postpublication
organization for ISO 26000, a result in line with the request made by the
WGSR itself at its final meeting.
69
In the drafting structure, the Chairs of the WGSR were assisted by a
Chairmen's Advisory Group (CAG) composed of a hybrid of appointed and
elected members. The CAG included the WGSR Chairs and Secretaries, the
Task Group (TG) conveners, and up to two representatives from each stake-
holder category.7 0 The process for selection of these representatives was to
be managed by the stakeholder group itself, which was instructed only to
follow the "twinning" principle of selecting one representative each from a
developed and a developing country and to provide "information to WG to
justify leadership role [sic] including a description of the selection pro-
cess."'" The WGSR "recommend[ed] the stakeholder groups to seek balance
on other criteria (e.g. gender, geography and expertise). '7 2 Additional repre-
(Sept. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Selection Process for TG Leadership], available at
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=8217865&objAction=Open.
67. ISO/TMB Res. 35/2004, supra note 28. The twinning concept involved sharing of
secretariats and chairmanships by developing and developed countries. The appointed WG
Chairs were corporate representatives: Mr. Jorge E.R. Cajazeira of Suzano Papel e Celulose,
Brazil, was Chair; Ms. Catarina Munck af Rosenschold of Volvo Car Corporation, Sweden,
was Vice-Chair. The Secretaries were representatives of SIS Sweden and ABNT Brazil. Pro-
posalfor Organizational Structure, supra note 44, at 3, 5.
68. Selection Process for TG Leadership, supra note 66. Review was done by the
WGSR Chairs in consultation with the Chairmen's Advisory Group (CAG). Proposal for Or-
ganizational Structure, supra note 44, at 3.
69. ISO WGSR, Resolutions from the 8th Meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, Copenhagen,
Denmark, 2010-05-17-21, Res. 9, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 193 (May 21, 2010) [here-
inafter 8th Meeting of the WGSR], available at http://www.iso26000cph20l0.dk/
graphics/S amfundsansvar.dk/iso26000cph/documents/N I93%2ODraft%20Resolutions%20Co
penhagen%20%2OMay%202010.pdf (proposing terms of reference and composition); ISO
WGSR, Post Publication Organization, at 1, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 192 rev 1 (May
21, 2010) [hereinafter Post Publication Organization], available at http://isotc.iso.org/
livelink/livelink/fetch/-8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/8742970/N 192rev 1 %2CPost_
PublicationOrganisation.pdf?nodeid=9245762&vemum=-2. See infra notes 165-166 and ac-
companying text.
70. Proposal for Organizational Structure, supra note 44, at 3-4.
71. ISO WGSR, Resolutions from the First Meeting of ISO/FMB/WG SR, Salvador,
Brazil 2005-03-07-11, Res. 2, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 15 (Mar. 17, 2005) [hereinafter
First Meeting of the WGSR], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&
objld=3973643&objAction=Open.
72. Id. The function of the CAG was advisory only, not decision making. It assisted the
chairs and secretariats of the WGSR in coordination, planning, and steering and advised on
strategic and critical issues, balanced representation in the TGs, newly identified developments
within the subject area, and gaps between those developments and WGSR outcomes. Id. Res. 4.
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sentatives to the influential CAG were designated by the WGSR Chair "if
necessary to ensure balance of representation (gender, regional distribution,
etc.)."73 Thus, neither the stakeholder groups' selection processes nor the
process used by the Chair to designate additional representatives were fixed
or reported in a transparent way.
2. Operating Procedures
As a result of the unusual scope of ISO 26000 in relation to ISO's tradi-
tional focus on technical standards, a tension persisted during the
development of ISO 26000 between the use of the established procedures
for standards development under the ISO/International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) Directives-and the use of ad hoc procedures "over and
above" the usual procedures, even when used only as exceptions or exemp-
tions to the established procedures.7 4 General operating procedures based on
the ISO/IEC Directives were set out at the first meeting of the WGSR,75 but
special procedures were submitted a number of times as the process
evolved, subject to approval by the ISO/TMB.76 In general, decision making
followed the rule of consensus; no voting was permitted in the WGSR or its
subsidiary bodies. The WGSR used the definition of "consensus" in the
ISO/IEC Directives:
73. Id. Res. 1.
74. NWIP, supra note 35, Annex E, §§ 1. 1, 4 (providing that any exception or exemp-
tion requests must be accompanied by a rationale and submitted to the ISO/TMB). The
ISO/IEC Directives were adopted in the context of ISO's earlier generation of standards that
require technical expertise and thus the participation of technical experts.
75. See First Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 71, Res. 21-22. The operating proce-
dures were subject to comments received before the first meeting, and the recommendations of
the Operating Procedures TG that had been co-chaired by the ISO Central Secretariat, were
submitted to the WGSR for approval. Id. Res. 22. The WGSR resolved that the foundation for
its operating procedures was Part 1 of the ISO/IEC Directives. Id. Res. 21.
76. The need for ad hoc procedures beyond the procedures established in the ISO/IEC
Directives surfaced almost immediately. See generally ISO WGSR, SR WG Procedures-
Compilation, ISO Doe. ISO/TMB/WG SR N XXX (Jan. 28, 2009) [hereinafter WGSR
Procedures], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/-8929321/8929339/
8929348/3935837/8162140/WG_ SR procedurescompilation_%2D_2009%2D01 .pdf?nodeid
=7939915&vemum=-2. For example, definitions of stakeholder categories and instruction to
national standards bodies for the selection of participants were subjects of written guidance.
Guidance on Stakeholder Categories, supra note 51, at I ("This guidance is a work in pro-
gress and, where necessary and based on experience, the ISOITMB/WG/SR may in the future
provide additional or revised guidance for any of these stakeholder categories."). The partici-
pation rights of observers, especially where experts believed the rights granted to an observer
diluted their own influence, resulted in the WGSR Chairs creating a new procedure for notifi-
cation and consultation with the expert (it was unclear whether the observer had an
opportunity to be heard). ISO WGSR, Operating Procedure on Observers, Special Advisors
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Consensus: general agreement, characterized by the absence of
sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of
the concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to
take into account the views of all parties concerned and to recon-
cile any conflicting arguments. NOTE: Consensus need not imply
unanimity.77
In implementing this consensus rule, the WGSR or TG Secretariat rec-
orded in the meeting minutes formal notifications by experts of their
"sustained opposition" when made at the same meeting at which the deci-
sion was taken; 78 it was then the responsibility of the Chair (or convener
when necessary), in consultation with the WGSR Secretary and WGSR
leadership, to decide if the sustained opposition was on a "substantial issue"
or by "an important part of the concerned interests."7 9 No definition of "sub-
stantial issue" was provided; the only guidance given was that "[i]n deciding
on whether the objection is made by an important part of the concerned in-
terests, the Chair/Convener should consider developed/developing country
and stakeholder representation." 0
The same consensus rule applied to decision making at the national
level in the mirror committees, with the additional criterion that all
stakeholder groups' positions should be treated equally, regardless of the
number of individuals included in the respective group.81 Although this
principle was already reflected in international-level procedures, the
national positions were to be developed by all interested parties at the
national level. Since decision-making procedures were independently
determined at the national level, the rule aimed to ensure that the different
interests represented by the stakeholder groups would all be adequately
reflected in national positions. The criteria for assessing consensus should
be based on the number of stakeholder groups in favor or opposed, not the
77. WGSR Procedures, supra note 76, Res. 22. The ISO/IEC Directives were updated
in 2011, but the relevant language quoted by the WGSR remains identical. ISO & IEC,
ISO/IEC DIRECTIVES, PART I: PROCEDURES FOR THE TECHNICAL WORK § 2.5.6 (8th ed. 2011)
[hereinafter ISO/IEC DIRECTIVES] (emphasis added), available at http://www.iec.ch/
members-experts/refdocs/iec/isoiecdir- I {ed8.0} en.pdf.
78. First Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 71, Res. 22, § 1.
79 Id.
80. Id. Appeals were permitted from procedural decisions, and could be raised by ex-
perts at the TG level to the WGSR, and within the WGSR to the ISO/TMB. Id. § 3. The
general provisions for appeal procedures for standardization activities are set out in an ISO
Supplement. ISO, ISO/IEC DIRECTIVES: SUPPLEMENT -PROCEDURES SPECIFIC TO ISO Il -




81. ISO WGSR, Development and Submission of National Positions to the WG SR, at 2,





absolute number of individuals in favor or opposed. However, the
committees were instructed that, when developing national positions, "each
individual's position should be treated equally, regardless of whether or not
the individual participates at the international level in the WG/SR."
8 2
Despite the efforts to ensure adequate representation of all interests in the
mirror committees, incomplete representation, particularly of trade unions,
persisted throughout the process.83
Along with the national consensus position, each ISO member body
was to submit a list of the stakeholder groups that participated in developing
the national position; if any of the six groups were lacking, the member
body was asked to explain why one or more stakeholder categories did not
participate. In addition, when a national stakeholder group substantively op-
posed the national position taken on a particular issue, the ISO member
body was to transmit that fact along with the position, informing the WGSR
of the reason for the opposition. 84
3. Operational Role of Public International Organizations
A number of public international organizations played an influential
role in the development of ISO 26000. In particular, ILO enjoyed a promi-
nent status and exercised special influence as a result of commitments
agreed to in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for cooperation in the
field of SR signed between ISO and ILO on March 4, 2005.85 The ISO/TMB
had supported the creation of an MoU to govern cooperation with ILO from
the start, reflecting a priority arising from the Advisory Group.8 6 At its first
82. Id.
83. ISO surveyed its member bodies participating in the ISO 26000 process, among
other reasons, to "identify gaps and improvement opportunities in the operation of the ISO
26000 mirror committees'" Survey on ISO 26000 Mirror Committees, supra note 59. The re-
plies from forty-three experts in thirty-three countries demonstrated that only "[fifty percent]
of the experts from developing countries consider[ed] that representatives from the six catego-
ries of stakeholders [were] participating in their mirror committee," and seventy-six percent of
the experts from developed countries affirmed full representation of stakeholder categories.
Only one labor expert was represented among the forty-three experts that replied. See PONTIF-
ICA UNIVERSIDAD CAT6LICA DE VALPARAISO & INTERAMERICAN CSR NETWORK, ISO SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY MIRROR COMMITTEE SURVEY: TASK GROUP I FUNDING AND STAKEHOLDER
ENGAGEMENT 2-3, 7, available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=
6195481 &objAction=Open.
84. WGSR Guidance on National Input, supra note 59.
85. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the International Labour Organiza-
tion and the International Organization of Standardization in the Field of Social
Responsibility, Mar. 4, 2005, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 18, http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/
livelinkfunc=ll&objld=3974921&objAction=Open [hereinafter ILO-ISO MoU]. In practical
terms, for example, the ILO representative served in a leading role on the Ad Hoc Group on
Design Specification Comments, which decided a number of important questions relating to
the scope and substance of the draft standard. Second Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 58,
Res. 2 (appointing Emily Sims of ILO as one of four conveners of the Ad Hoc Group on De-
sign Specification Comments).
86. See supra notes 28, 30, and accompanying text.
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meeting, the WGSR resolved to adopt operating procedures to help imple-
ment the ILO-ISO MoU by recognizing
the special status of ILO as reflected in the MoU signed between
ILO and ISO on 4 March 2005... specifically, the leadership of the
WG as well as of any of its subgroups will consult ILO when start-
ing their work and regularly thereafter (at the different drafting and
circulation stages) to identify early on any ILO issues that may
come up and thus ensure the effective and timely implementation of
articles 1.2, 2.1 through 2.4, 6.1 and 6.2 of the MoU. Participation
of ILO and its constituents in any of the subgroups will be guided
by the provisions of Article 5 of the MoU.87
The decision of the WGSR relating to ILO gave effect to an ISO/TMB
resolution confirming the "commitment to collaboration between the two
organizations [ISO and ILO] on the basis of the guiding principles proposed
by the ILO as pre-requisites to preparation of a Memorandum of Under-
standing between the two organizations."88 The ISO-ILO MoU based
cooperation on a common commitment that
any guidance or other ISO International Standard to be developed
in the area of social responsibility, which implicates ILO issues will
be fully consistent with the object and purpose of the provisions of
international labour standards incorporated in ILO instruments, and
their interpretation by the competent bodies of the ILO and in no
way detract from the provisions of those standards.8 9
Further, any ISO postpublication activities, "insofar as they implicate
ILO issues, will: Facilitate greater awareness and wider observance of inter-
national labour standards ... [clomplement the role of governments in
ensuring compliance with international labour standards; and [p]ermit appli-
cation without discrimination as to type and size of all concerned." 90 In
addition, the MoU grants priority to international labor standards in any cas-
es of conflict during the development or after the publication of any ISO
standard in the field of SR, as well as in any cases of conflict between an
ISO standard and any private initiative with which ISO may collaborate. 91
The MoU also stated that "any ISO activities in the field of social responsi-
bility will avoid addressing ILO issues that should only be resolved through
87. First Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 71, Res. 29.
88. ISO/TMB, Resolutions Adopted by the Technical Management Board at Its 32nd
Meeting, 10-11 February 2005, Geneva (Switzerland), Res. 3/2005, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG
SR N 12, available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=3974917&
objAction=Open. For the ILO-ISO MoU, see supra note 85.
89. ILO-ISO MoU, supra note 85, art. 2.1.
90. Id. art. 2.2.
91. Id. art. 2.3.
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representative political or legal processes, and which the Parties agree to
identify in consultation.
92
As a result of ILO's favored treatment, other international institutions
sought similar treatment although, unlike ILO, they were technically operat-
ing as D-liaison organizations under the generally applicable rules that ISO
has fixed for such organizations.93 By November 2006, the U.N. Global
Compact had entered into an agreement with ISO on SR that called for con-
sistency in content with its ten principles. 94 By May 2008, the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had a similar agree-
ment calling for consistency with the principles and standards of OECD
guidelines and their implementation provision, Article 2.1. 95 Like ILO, the
OECD required a commitment that ISO activities would "facilitate greater
awareness and wider observance" of its own publicly adopted instruments. 6
These two agreements differed from the ISO-ILO MoU, however, in several
key respects. First, the other MoUs did not provide for a separate influence
of the public organizations on the outcome of the vote by ISO member
bodies on the final ISO standard. Unlike the ILO-ISO MoU, the later
agreements did not require ISO to circulate the IGOs' comments on the
FDIS at the decisive final moment to the voting member bodies.97 Instead
they followed the general rules of the ISO/IEC Directives under which sup-
port is sought from D-liaison organizations and is then taken into account by
the ISO/TMB after the vote rather than prior to submission to a vote, a tim-
ing with less potential impact than that provided for the ILO. Second, unlike
the ILO-ISO MoU, the other MoUs allowed ISO more influence on policy
matters in the public organizations through reciprocity provisions; both the
OECD and U.N. Global Compact agreements permit ISO to participate in
the public organization's structures and procedures relating to further
92. Id. art. 2.4.
93. D-liaison organizations may make technical contributions to and participate actively
as members of an ISO working group, but at the time of submission of matters to member
bodies, they have no vote. ISO/IEC DIRECTIVES, supra note 77, § 1.17.3.1; see id. § 1.7.1.
94. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations Global Compact Of-
fice and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), art. 2.1, Jun. 11, 2006, ISO
Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 82, http://isotc.iso.orglivelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=5936532&
objAction=Open [hereinafter ISO-Global Compact MoU].
95. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) in the Area of Social Responsibility, art. 1.1, May 21, 2008, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG
SR N 144, http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=7369892&objAction=Open
[hereinafter ISO-OECD MoU].
96. Id. art. 2.7.
97. Cf ILO-ISO MoU, supra note 85, arts. 2.1.2-.3 ("Any committee or enquiry draft
... will be the subject of a pre-circulation process seeking the full and formal backing of the
ILO relating to any of the elements in such draft Standard that implicate ILO issues prior to
circulation for vote and/or comment .... In the event ILO does not provide the backing...
ILO's comments ... will be circulated, together with the draft Standard ... to all statutory
ISO members ... prior to submission to a vote by any ISO body.").
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development of their relevant instruments.9" In the case of the OECD, this
access is governed by the OECD's rules of procedure and "on the Decision
by the Council governing [OECD's] Relations with International Non-
Governmental Organisations." 99 The implications of these commitments are
striking as they give ISO, the private organization, access to the public deci-
sion-making processes of the two public organizations.
Despite their diversity, all the agreements concluded between ISO and
the public international organizations reflect that, where public international
standards are so integrally involved in a private standardization initiative,
ISO's traditional D-liaison-status operating structure does not go far enough
to effectively represent the expertise and perspectives of international organ-
izations beholden to the collective will of their member states. ISO's
operating procedures, as set out in the ISO/IEC Directives, permit D-liaison
organizations to submit their comments at the same time as ISO's
P-members vote at the CD stage, and the D-liaison organizations have the
opportunity to provide full and formal backing to ISO at the DIS stage. 00
Neither stage permits direct influence by D-liaison organizations on ISO
member bodies. Only the ILO-ISO MoU moved beyond ISO's established
procedural constraints by providing that any comments submitted by the
ILO would be circulated by ISO to the voting members at the time of their
review and vote on the FDIS. In essence, this circulation was envisaged as a
means of communication between ILO and the ISO member bodies them-
selves at a decisive moment. In the absence of this feature, ILO's comments
would normally have been treated as comments of an organization in liaison
with ISO under its Directives and would have been submitted to the
ISO/TMB at the time that the vote already taken by the member bodies was
reported.' 0
This close interaction of public and private standards spheres in the de-
velopment of ISO 26000 provides ample justification for further innovations
in operating procedures to help establish an appropriate balance between
private standardization and public mandates. For example, it would be help-
ful in such cases to provide for an additional procedure by which the
comments of publicly mandated organizations like the United Nations, its
specialized agencies, and the OECD would help to inform national member
98. ISO-OECD MoU, supra note 95, art. 4.2; ISO-Global Compact MoU, supra note
94, art. 4.2.
99. ISO-OECD MoU, supra note 95, art. 4.2 (referring to the governance process and
decision-making organ by which ISO participation in appropriate OECD bodies would be ap-
proved).
100. NWIP, supra note 35, Annex E, at 2.
101. Compare ISO WGSR, Result of Ballot ISO/FDIS 26000, at 6, ISO Doc.
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 196 (Sept. 13, 2010) [hereinafter FDIS Ballot], available at
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=9779426&objAction=Open, with ILO,
Comments of the International Labour Office for Circulation with ISO/FDIS 26000: 2010(E),




bodies that operate in the context of laws and policies set by the countries
that, in many cases, also act as member states of the international organiza-
tions concerned. In addition, greater deference to already established public
norms and policies should guide private bodies in making decisions involv-
ing public mandates, including through higher-level resolution of conflicts
when they arise. In contrast, the procedure used in developing ISO 26000,
which was based on the general ISO procedures, required public interna-
tional organizations to appeal to the private structures established by ISO as
a nongovernmental international organization, such as a TG or the
ISO/TMB, to review a decision adverse to its mandate or to decisions and
standards established by its member states in whose countries the ISO
member bodies operate. 0 2 Under this procedure, the private sector prevails
over public authority unless proven otherwise, a situation that reverses the
recognized role of government in the exercise of public authority over pri-
vate conduct.
Despite the need for more deliberate coordination of the public and
private spheres in developing private standards relating to public policy, the
ISO's Principles for Developing ISO and IEC Standards Related to or Sup-
porting Public Policy Initiatives (ISO Principles)"°3 adopted during the
development of ISO 26000, reflect ISO's choice as an organization to revert
to its fixed structures and procedures used for highly technical discussions
and to discourage sui generis arrangements of the sort negotiated during the
ISO 26000 process, such as the ILO MoU. 1 4 The idea of a restructured in-
teraction in the event of a compelling decision to move forward in other
similar situations is discussed further below.'05
4. Meaningful Participation: Foreign Languages
The ISO WGSR leadership recognized that representativity without in-
formation and transparency would render participation meaningless. For that
reason, the role of language became an important dynamic in the drafting
process. Although English speakers remained at a decided advantage
throughout the process, the WGSR set up Translation Task Forces (TTFs) to
102. ISO PROCEDURES SUPPLEMENT, supra note 80.
103. ISO, PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPING ISO AND IEC STANDARDS RELATED TO OR SuP-
PORTING PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVES (2007) [hereinafter ISO PRINCIPLES], available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/principles for developingiso.andiec standards related -to or_
supporting-publicpolicyjinitiatives.pdf. The ISO Principles derive from ISO's 2007 General
Assembly Open Session on International Standards and Public Policy and are intended as
guidance to ISO's internal structures. The Open Session was denominated "At the Crossroads"
and its panelists, including a representative of the U.N. Global Compact, sought to "explore
the new relations between public authorities and policies and voluntary standardization." Open
Session of the ISO General Assembly 2007, International Standards and Public Policies, Sept.
20, 2007, at 6 (program brochure), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/livelinkgetfile?
lINodeId=I 14735&llVolId=-2000. See infra notes 182-190 and accompanying text.
104. ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 2.
105. See infra Part VI.
Spring 20121
Michigan Journal of International Law
translate documents that its members considered essential to permit or fa-
cilitate exchanges between experts, observers, and liaison organizations, and
to give information on the work of the WGSR to those countries and regions
in dedicated networks. Such TTFs were established for French, Spanish,
Arabic, Russian, and German, in that sequence; the French effort began
about six months after the first meeting of the WGSR, and the German one,
two years later. 106
At the time of ISO 26000's publication, the issue of translating the offi-
cial authoritative legal texts that were quoted in ISO 26000 arose again. It
was the subject of ILO comments on the FDIS that were circulated to all
ISO member bodies urging national member bodies to defer to competent
public authorities (principally labor ministries) regarding translations of ILO
terminology.107 The comments aimed to ensure that the wording adopted in
the authoritative text of ISO 26000, where it tracked ILO conventions and
terminology, would be consistently translated by ISO members in their
translations of ISO 26000 into their national languages, because such trans-
lations are not certified by ISO as accurate or official.
C. Search for Normative Coherence
From the start, coherence between ISO 26000 and relevant international
legal and social norms was a planned outcome. The NWIP clarified that it was
expected that the standard will ... foster greater awareness and
wider observance of agreed sets of universal principles as expressed
in United Nations conventions and declarations including the Glob-
al Compact principles and particularly the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, [ILO] Declarations on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel-
opment and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
.. [and will] compliment [sic] and avoid conflicts with other exist-
ing SR standards and requirements.' 8
Complementary roles were thus foreseen for both international and national
law and standards on the one hand, and private voluntary initiatives on the
other hand, a vision that reflected the somewhat dubitable presumption that
due convergence already existed between the two spheres.' 9
106. A Spanish Translation Task Force (TTF) created an official Spanish version of ISO
26000. First Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 71, Res. 26-28. The French standards institute,
Association Franqaise de Normalisation (AFNOR), took responsibility for translation into
French of draft standards at the DIS and FDIS stages. Second Meeting of the WGSR, supra
note 58, Res. 34. Arabic and Russian TTFs were created thereafter, Third Meeting of the
WGSR, supra note 55, Res. 1-2, and a German TTF was formed later on, 5th Meeting of the
WGSR, supra note 59, Res. 16.
107. Comments for Circulation, supra note 101.
108. N1WIP, supra note 35, Annex B, § f.
109. See id. Annex B.
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The means for assuring due deference to policy and lawmakers in order
to achieve normative coherence were unclear and even doubtful from the
start. The terms of reference in the NWIP stated that "leaving the legal is-
sues to inter-governmental organizations ... may not be helpful."' ISO
recognized from the beginning that "it is necessary to consider the activities
of other bodies that have developed or are developing SR standards, norms,
guidelines and tools."11' For ISO, this meant including both IGOs and non-
governmental international SR initiatives in the process." 2 The result was a
development process that relied heavily on two fundamental, and sometimes
competing, sources of input: expertise on the one hand, including from rep-
resentatives of public international organizations with relevant mandates,
and the participation of representative interest groups on the other hand." 3
The strategy, simply stated, was to put the right stakeholders together and
achieve consensus among them. In general, for ISO 26000, ISO followed four
phases of development: designing the standard, elaborating on the subject
matter, drafting the provisions, and obtaining approval through consensus.
In the design phase, a proposal for design specifications sent to ISO
member bodies revealed the significant implications of such a standard for
international legal norms.1 14 The aim was to create a standard that "provides
guidance to enable an organization to formulate SR systems taking into ac-
count communication of stakeholders," though it was "not a management
system standard."' 15 Part One was conceived to be "Generic Guidance for all
types of Organizations" and included core subjects and relevant issues, such
as legal issues, human rights issues (including labor rights), human resource
issues, health and safety issues (for employees' and more broadly), product
and service issues, environmental issues, community issues, stakeholder is-
sues, anticorruption issues, and governance issues.16 ISO 26000 was
intended to provide guidance on the relation between SR and the following
fields: the law (national and international), international norms
(distinguished from international law in some sense that was not evident),
domestic and intergovernmental political processes, and regional and cultur-
al differences." 7 Part Two of the proposed specifications was to cover
110. Id. Annex B, § c.
Ill. Id. Annex D.
112. The NWIP specified a number of SR initiatives that needed to be considered "as
their standards could be affected by the introduction of an ISO deliverable." Id. Annex D (re-
ferring to, for example, the GRI, the Forest Stewardship Council [FSC], and the Fair Labor
Association [FLA]).
113. See supra Part II1.A.
114. ISO WGSR, ISO Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility-ISO 26000: Pro-
posalfor Design Specification, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 31 (2005), http://isotc.iso.org/
livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=4329261&objAction=Open [hereinafter Proposal for Design
Specification].
115. Id. at 1. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
116. Proposalfor Design Specification, supra note 114, pt. 1, § 5.
117. Id. pt. 1, § 6.
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"Specific Guidance for Particular Types of Organizations ... in addition to
and distinct from material provided in Part 1." 18 The "particular types of or-
ganizations" corresponded to the particular stakeholder categories:
government organizations, NGOs, commercial organizations (including in-
dustry), consumer organizations, labor organizations, and other
organizations (later specified as "service, support, research and others"). I9
A highly selective combination of expertise and representative interests
guided the work to implement the design specifications. At its first meeting,
the WGSR received comments that had been submitted on the circulated
design proposal. At its second meeting, an Ad Hoc Group on Design Speci-
fication Comments was composed, led by a small number of selected
participants, including ILO (represented by an official from the International
Labour Office) and its constituents (represented by labor and employer
members).120 That Ad Hoc Group's decisions were reflected in a revised
draft Design Specification drafted by another Ad Hoc Group on Design
Specification Drafting, composed of approximately sixteen people, two of
whom were leaders in the Ad Hoc Group on Design Comments. The others
were nominated by the leadership members. 2 ' The Design Specification
was adopted within six months of the first meeting of the WGSR.Y22
A number of structures within the WGSR advanced the elaboration of
the specifications and the drafting stages. Without a doubt, the selection of
members for these structures, often determined by the WGSR leadership,'23
defined the substantive outcome. A series of TGs-first interim groups to
draft issues papers and then standard-writing groups-were used to elabo-
rate the approach to the various specifications. 24 The TGs, given terms of
reference, dealt in three main relevant areas: scope, SR context, and SR
principles; guidance on core SR subjects and issues; and guidance for organ-
izations on implementing SR.'25 Seven core subjects were assigned
respectively to drafting teams: organizational governance, human rights, la-
bor practices, the environment, fair operating practices, consumer issues,
118. Id. pt. 2.
119. Id.; Guidance on Stakeholder Categories, supra note 51, at 1.
120. Second Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 58, Res. 2. Representatives came from
labor and from the IOE. See id.; see also 1st ISO Social Responsibility Plenary Meeting, Mar.
7-11, 2005, List of Participants ISOIMB/WG Social Responsibility, at 5, 6, available at
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/-8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/3973638/
3973639/4243588/AnnexA%2CAttendanceilist.pdfnodeid--4242844&vernum=-2 (identi-
fying Adam Greene and Thomas Thomas with industry and labor, respectively).
121. Second Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 58, Res. 3-4, 19.
122. See ISO WGSR, ISO Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility-ISO 26000:
Design Specification, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 49 (Sept. 30, 2005), available at
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=4557938&objAction=Open.
123. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
124. Second Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 58, Res. 5.
125. Id. Res. 20-22.
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and community involvement and development.126 A number of the subjects,
including but not limited to labor, touched on international labor standards,
for which ILO considered itself competent to raise concerns as "ILO issues"
under the ILO-ISO MoU. Liaison representatives were established to coor-
dinate issues to be addressed in two or more groups, 127 and internal liaisons
with other work on related subjects in ISO technical committees were en-
sured.' 28 As the input was delivered, an Integrated Drafting Task Force
served as a powerful means to coordinate input from the drafting teams es-
tablished within the TGs. The Integrated Drafting Task Force was charged
with maintaining transparency by tracking changes to reports, writing "clari-
fications on how stakeholder representation [was] ensured," and producing
reports "based on consensus."'129 Complaints over the lack of transparency in
accepting and rejecting some of the inputs were frequent, as the Integrated
Drafting Task Force processed and responded to thousands of comments in
the various stages of the draft standard. 3 °
The tension between the role of standards based in law and the role of
private voluntary initiatives' became evident as the drafting process ma-
tured. The rule of respecting the primacy of intergovernmental instruments
and subordinating private initiative standards, as first articulated in the ILO-
ISO MoU, led to a need to distinguish exactly what were "authoritative
international instruments" that would require deference. 3 2 ILO experts
shared the view, based on an internal ILO legal opinion, that the "authorita-
tive character" of ISO's international standards and other instruments were
the result of an act of official endorsement by the specific authorized organ
126. 4th Meeting of WGSR, supra note 65, Res. 3. For a list of the members of the
drafting teams, see ISO, TG 5 DRAFTING TEAMS, http://isotc.iso.org/Iivelink/livelink/fetch/-
8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/4591396/4591399/6227179/WGSRTG5_Drafting_
Teams established-inSydneyrev_2007%2D I 2%2D 11 .pdf?nodeid=7013931 &vernum=-2.
127. Second Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 58, Res. 24.
128. E.g., id. Res. 29 (confirming internal liaison with ISOFTC 207, Environmental
Management).
129. ISO WGSR, Process for WG SR Integrated Drafting, at 1, ISO Doc. ISOFrMB/WG
SR N 130 rev 1 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=
ll&objld=6942047&objAction=Open.
130. ISO WGSR, Minutes, Constitution of Integrated Drafting Task Force, IDTF, § 3.4,
ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 133 (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/
livelink?func=ll&objld=6942543&objAction=Open. Responses to approximately 3400 com-
ments were recorded for the CD version of the standard alone. ISO WGSR, Comments
Received on ISO/CD 26000 (WG SR N 157), ISO Doc. ISOfIMB/WG SR N 161 (Mar. 25,
2009) [hereinafter Comments Received], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?
func=ll&objId=7998977&objAction=Open.
131. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
132. See 5th Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 59, Res. 19; ISO WGSR, Contribution to
Development of the Community and Society: Drafting Team Final Report, § 4.3, ISO Doc.
ISOfTMB/WG SR TG5 (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/
-8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/4591396/4591399/7027478/DCS_%2D DT final_
report_071206_rev.pdf?nodeid=7027686&vernum=-2 (referring to previous discussions in
standard-setting TGs, such as "Issues for further discussion" (authoritative instruments)).
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concerned. 133 In the end, ISO 26000 did not clearly distinguish the intergov-
ernmental initiatives based on such publicly recognized international
standards from nongovernmental initiatives drawn largely from their own
definitions of socially responsible conduct. In an effort to respond to the
commitment in the ILO-ISO MoU to consistency and complementarity with
existing SR initiatives, an annex was added to ISO 26000 listing various ini-
tiatives and attempting to compare them. The annex, entitled "Examples of
Voluntary Initiatives and Tools for Social Responsibility,' 34 is described as
"informative" and expressly states that participation or use of any of the
listed initiatives or tools is not a precondition for an organization to be so-
cially responsible.'35 The criteria that must be met to be included in the
annex pertain to subject matter, international and interorganizational
breadth, and accessibility without charge, but the annex further explains that
inclusion in the annex does not constitute an endorsement by ISO.
136
Nevertheless, the annex created major controversies. Governments sought
to prevent any legal implications arising from an ISO-monitored list of initia-
tives, including in the context of international trade agreements. 137 At the same
time, the annex initiatives' supporters "sought to maximize the visibility or
significance of 'their' standards" to enhance their own influence.'38
In the end, the consensus approval that ISO 26000 received, while not
determinative of normative coherence, indicated at least some achieve-
ment-albeit limited in time because international law evolves over time
and the full normative impact of the standard's provisions can only be un-
derstood in operation. The level of consensus on ISO 26000 was measured
sequentially over several draft versions-three Working Drafts, the CD, the
DIS, and the FDIS. 139 The progressive convergence of support was obtained
133. ILO OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, LEGAL ISSUES ARISING IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE ISO DRAFT STANDARD ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2007) (on file with author).
134. The annex already appeared under this title in the Draft International Standard ver-
sion as Annex A. ISO WGSR, Draft International Standard: Guidance on Social
Responsibility, at 82, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 172 (2009) [hereinafter WGSR DIS],
available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=8385467&objAction=Open.
135. Id. at x. The proposal was developed on the basis that an annex of initiatives should
not be seen to endorse any initiative presented. ISO, Proposed Annex on Social Responsibility
Initiatives, at 1, ISO Doc. IDTF N053-ISO 26000 WD4.1 (Mar. 11, 2008), available at
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=7188059&objAction=Open. In its informa-
tive and illustrative character, the annex resembles the interim products used by ISO when
standardization is not yet mature. The development of the annex casts some doubt on ISO's posi-
tion at the start that harmonization of approaches to social responsibility was not possible and
that the goal should be standardization. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., WGSR DIS, supra note 134, at 83.
137. Halina Ward, The ISO 26000 International Guidance Standard on Social Responsi-
bility: Implications for Public Policy and Transnational Democracy, 12 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 665, 698-700 (2011).
138. Id. at 684.
139. The voting results on the CD, DIS, and, ultimately, FDIS show progressively more
support. See ISO WGSR, Result ISO/CD 26000, Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO Doc.
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by avoiding several key issues relating to the operation of the private stand-
ardization and public spheres of law and policy. To the extent that ISO
26000 could have been viewed as an international standard affecting the de-
velopment of technical regulations by states under the Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) Agreement, 140 some governments and other participants
viewed it as reducing the national-level policy space already provided for in
the TBT Agreement, or as giving rise to unnecessary trade restrictions.
141
Eventually, an express disclaimer was added to the scope clause of ISO
26000, providing that the standard is not intended to be interpreted as an
"international standard" for the purpose of providing a basis for a presump-
tion or finding that a measure is consistent with World Trade Organization
(WTO) obligations. ISO 26000 further disclaimed itself as a basis for legal
action in any other international, domestic, or other proceeding or as evi-
dence of the evolution of customary international law.
4 2
When the DIS was submitted to ISO members for their vote, ISO stated
that it would give all comments, whether submitted by its NSBs or by liaison
organizations, fair and equitable treatment in order to further enhance consen-
sus.14 3 Although this approach might appear nondiscriminatory at the outset,
the result of providing equal weight to participants in different situations, with
different constituencies, and with varying relevance to the issues at hand, was
not necessarily benign in effect. Continuing disagreement marked the use of
the comments as the basis for constituting the DIS text. The formal vote
among member bodies on the DIS showed disagreement among important
blocs: of P-members voting, seventy-nine percent in favor (required threshold
of two-thirds in favor); of member bodies voting there were eighteen negative
votes out of seventy-eight, resulting in twenty-three percent negative, just un-
der the twenty-five percent negative required to block the process toward the
FDIS. 4 Regional blocs were evident: Arab states almost all voted negatively,
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 160 (Mar. 25, 2009), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/
livelink?func=ll&objld=8000253&objAction=Open; ISO WGSR, Preliminary Voting Result
ISO/DIS 26000, ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 175 (Feb. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Preliminary
Voting Result], available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objld=8718817&
objAction=Open; FDIS Ballot, supra note 101.
140. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter
TBT Agreement].
141. See, e.g., Comments Received, supra note 130, at 33, 52, 54-55, 61 (including
comments from member bodies of Canada and Malaysia, and from representatives of business
organizations); see also Ward, supra note 137, at 699-700 (discussing concerns of the Canadi-
an, Chinese, Indian, and U.S. governments).
142. For a discussion of the negotiation on "WTO-proofing" the text, see Ward, supra
note 137, at 700-01.
143. See ISO WGSR, Clarifying the Rules and Procedures for CD, DIS, FDIS, at 13, 15,
ISO Doc. ISO/TMB/WG SR N 169 (May 16, 2009), available at http://isotc.iso.org/
livelink/livelink?func=l&objld=8160798&objAction=Open.
144. Preliminary Voting Result, supra note 139, at 1.
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along with China, Malaysia, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Vietnam.,
45 Im-
portant member bodies featured among the abstentions: Austria, Germany,
Iceland, Italy, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. 46 Some governments
were alarmed at the potential implications for trade; 47 others thought the
standard did not go far enough. 48 Had abstentions been counted toward the
quota, the vote would have failed and another DIS version would have been
required. Indeed, for a process targeting operational consensus, to move for-
ward without counting abstentions as well as negative votes could arguably
demonstrate a lack of confidence in the overall acceptance of ISO 26000, even
though, technically speaking, consensus may be achieved when it is defined as
insufficient objections to moving forward.
Between the DIS vote and the FDIS vote, progress toward consensus was
made. The FDIS vote brought significantly more favorable percentages: nine-
ty-three of voting P-members voted "Yes," and only six percent of all member
bodies voting voted "No"; five negative votes out of member bodies voting
were recorded. 49 However, new abstentions from those member bodies that
had approved the DIS emerged at the time of the FDIS: Australia, Bangladesh,
Hungary, Israel, and Macedonia. 5 ° Two member bodies actually switched
from "Yes" to "No" votes (Luxembourg and the United States), and Iran
switched from "No" to an abstention. 5' With a change to a controversial pro-
vision on discrimination for reasons of sexual orientation, the Arab bloc
switched from "No" to "Yes" (Bahrain, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), as did China and
Cyprus.'52 India remained opposed.'53
In the final stage, in response to ISO's request for its full and formal
backing of the FDIS, ILO replied'54 that it was considering whether the
FDIS was fully consistent with international labor standards and practices
and would not detract from them, as provided in the ILO-ISO MoU. Ac-
cording to ILO, this determination involved (1) the current content of ISO
26000; and (2) the impact of its future implementation, including through
ISO activities and publications for promotion and any periodic review.'55 On
145. Id. at 2-4.
146. Id.
147. Ward, supra note 137, at 699-700 (discussing concerns of the Canadian, Chinese,
Indian, and U.S. governments).
148. Comments Received, supra note 130, at 28-29 (listing comments from Jamaica).
149. FDIS Ballot, supra note 101, at 1.
150. Id. at 2-4.
151. Id. at 3-4.
152. Id. at 2-4.
153. Id. at 2. An appeal of the national member body of India, disputing the decision to add
the annex of initiatives, was dismissed by the ISOf'TMB in June 2010. ISOiTMB Res. 115/2010
(Sept. 13-14, 2010) (copy on file with author). See supra note 135 and accompanying text.




the first point, ILO concluded that the cooperation with ISO had "resulted in
provisions in the FDIS, which, insofar as ILO issues are implicated, do not
appear to conflict with international labor standards as currently understood
and applied.' 56 On the operational impact point, ILO referred to still-
pending efforts to establish with ISO "specific and concrete arrangements to
ensure the standard's consistency, over time, with international labor stand-
ards and practices."'' 57 There was
a need for measures that can reliably ensure that, as applied, the
Standard will i) be consistent with and facilitate the observance of
international labor standards, ii) be applied without discrimination,
and iii) ensure that international labor standards take priority where
conflicts or questions arise on ILO issues, including in relation to
periodic revision."'
ILO's business and workers' representatives' social partners diverged in
their views on the final outcome. The International Trade Union Confedera-
tion (ITUC) cautiously supported the standard, saying that it would
"contribute to a better understanding of social responsibility through its clar-
ification of important concepts" and that the "text provides a comprehensive
distillation of responsible labour practices that are consistent with the inter-
national labour standards of the ILO."' 59 The global workers' organization
qualified its support in its FDIS comments, stating the belief that the "so-
called 'multi-stakeholder process' used has serious flaws and is not suitable
for public policy issues[,] which are best addressed through democratic and
representative political processes.' ' 6 The IOE, which had also participated
closely in ISO 26000's development, withheld its full and formal backing of
the FDIS due to the "persistent confusion about what ISO 26000 is and is
not, the push for certification by national standards bodies, and the process
used to develop the guidance," which it considered not sufficiently consulta-
tive with representatives of the main stakeholders. 16 1 In contrast, the U.N.
Global Compact submitted comments as a liaison organization approving





159. ITUC, News: ITUC Supports New International Standard on Social Responsibility,
ITUC-CSI (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.ituc-csi.org/ituc-supports-new-intemational.html?
lang=en.
160. ITUC, ITUC Comment on ISO 26000 FDIS (Sept. 10, 2010), available at
http://isotc.iso.org/livelinkAivelink?func=ll&objId=3935837&objAction=browse&sort=name
(included in file titled "x Comments received on ISO FDIS 26000.zip").
161. IOE, supra note 57, at 4.
162. See FDIS Ballot, supra note 101.
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D. Search for Postpublication Continuity
The question of continuity following ISO 26000's publication persists at
the time of this writing. There was no expectation of continuing life for the
"ISO SR community" after disbanding of the WGSR, unlike the ongoing
public sector structures for supervising standards set by law or policy. In the
postpublication phase, ISO has tackled the challenge of maintaining stake-
holder networks, engagement of NSBs and their stakeholders, and the
engagement and role of MoU partners like ILO and the U.N. Global Com-
pact.'63 Apart from ISO press releases, the decisions and activities
undertaken in relation to ISO 26000 following its publication remain largely
unavailable to the public, in contrast to the documents of the now disbanded
WGSR, which were made available online."6 The result suggests that the
implementation phases of the private standard will seek to engage public en-
tities' involvement, again, in a manner and only to the extent decided by the
private leadership.
Following publication of ISO 26000, the ISO/TMB deferred the organi-
zation of postpublication activities to the Swedish Standards Institute (SIS)
and the Associaqdo Brasileira de Normas T6cnicas (ABNT) (Sweden's and
Brazil's member bodies, respectively), which had chaired the WGSR. In so
doing, the ISO/TMB requested the twinned leadership take into account the
WGSR proposals regarding postpublication organization. 165 The ISO Cen-
tral Secretariat (ISO/CS) was to work together with the twinned leadership
in dealing with inquiries from international-level organizations, and national
member bodies were encouraged to maintain committees of experts at the
national level based on multistakeholder composition and balance.'66 By
November, SIS and ABNT announced the ISO 26000's postpublication or-
ganization (PPO). 167 The terms of reference for the PPO were defined as
assessing and advising ISO/TMB on any proposals to revise ISO 26000; ad-
vising ISO/CS on requests for interpretation of ISO 26000 from NSBs;
advising ISO/CS on promotion, communication, and training activities;
gathering and reporting to ISO/CS information on good and bad practices in
using ISO 26000; reviewing and assessing results; and advising
ISO/TMB. 68 The three main structures of the ISO 26000 development
163. ISO/TMB Res. 114/2010 (Sept. 13-14, 2010) (on file with author); see also 8th
Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 69, Res. 8, 10.
164. ISO/TMB Res. 114/2010, supra note 163, Annex 2; SIS, ISO 26000 PosT
PUBLICATION ORGANIZATION (2010), available at http://isotc.iso.orglivelinklivelink/
fetchl-8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/3974907/10335362/PPO%2CPostPublication_
Organization for ISO 26000_activities_.pdf?nodeid=1 1967859&vemum=-2.
165. ISO/TMB Res. 114/2010, supra note 163, T 3.
166. Post Publication Organization, supra note 69; ISO/TMB Res. 114/2010, supra note
163.
167. SIS, supra note 164.
168. Id. These functions follow the Proposed Terms of Reference for Post Publication




phase were replicated: a PPO Secretariat is led by SIS and ABNT; the
WGSR Advisory Group has been reincarnated as a PPO Stakeholder Advi-
sory Group (PPO SAG) with two additional representatives for each
stakeholder category; and a PPO NSB Information Network (PPO NIN) rec-
reates a network akin to the mirror committees, with a maximum number of
two members per country. 
169
A vital question persists concerning how provisions of ISO 26000 relat-
ing to authoritative legal instruments are to be handled under the
responsibility of the private leadership. At the time of voting on ISO 26000,
ITUC had qualified its support of the FDIS provisions relating to labor by
stating: "With respect to follow-up we are convinced the ILO must be pro-
vided an authoritative advisory role on all questions relating to ILO issues in
the promotion or implementation of this standard."' 170 In its comments on the
FDIS, '7 ILO had sought further specificity in the organization of its post-
publication cooperation with ISO. The terms of the ILO-ISO MoU apply
expressly to the postpublication implementation of ISO 26000, including
development, promotion, interpretation, and periodic review of ISO 26000,
drawing on the basis of the general commitments in the MoU.172 This in-
cluded an authoritative advisory role for ILO on all questions relating to
ILO issues in the promotion or implementation of ISO 26000, including
questions raised by ISO members, a role that ISO accepted in the postpubli-
cation operating guidelines.'73 Additionally included was an assurance that
official translations of international labor standards would revert to ILO-
approved local language texts and a guarantee of prior consultation on ISO
decisions involving ILO issues.'74 Similarly, questions relating to interna-
tional instruments cited in ISO 26000 were to be directed to the respective
responsible organization.'75 Proposed operating guidelines are expected to
be developed for "how issues of interpretation will be dealt with including
how questions related to authoritative instruments will be interpreted."'
' 76
The future impact of ISO 26000 in the marketplace also remains in
question. Efforts by NSBs to develop national certification variants of ISO
26000 run counter to the statement in the text of the standard itself "that ISO
26000 'is not intended or appropriate for certification purposes .... Any of-
fer to certify, or claims to be certified, to ISO 26000 would be a
169. SIS, supra note 164. The first two structures were suggested by the WGSR at its
final meeting. Id.
170. See ITUC, supra note 160.
171. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
172. ILO-ISO MoU, supra note 85, at 4.
173. SIS, supra note 164, at 2.
174. Comments for Circulation, supra note 101.
175. Post Publication Organization, supra note 69. Questions related to international in-
struments cited in the bibliography of ISO 26000 are to be directed to the respective
"responsible organization," although it is not clear how the "responsible organization" will be
determined. Id. at 2.
176. Id. at 1.
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misrepresentation of the intent and purpose and a misuse of'" the stand-
ard.'77 Fewer than two months after publication of ISO 26000, the
independent International Accreditation Forum (IAF), whose members ac-
credit certification bodies as competent to issue certifications, passed the
following resolution, noting that ISO 26000 itself explicitly states that it is
not intended or appropriate for certification:
The General Assembly, acting on the recommendation of the Tech-
nical Committee, resolved that there will not be any accredited
certification to ISO 26000 (publication date 1 November 2010).
Therefore, Certification Bodies are strongly urged not to promote or
provide certification to ISO 26000 and Accreditation Bodies and
Certification Bodies are requested to report any misuse or need for
certification, to the ISO Central Secretariat.
178
At the international level, bridging documents have been proposed by volun-
tary initiative programs like GRI and AccountAbility 1000.'9
Ironically, ISO's self-professed "business model" may make more diffi-
cult the continuity of the SR community to the extent that it was based on
representativity. From the first draft of ISO 26000, a copyright notice was
inserted, referencing ISO's usual rules for copyright protection and its cus-
tomary exception for reproduction of working drafts or CDs for use by
participants in the ISO standards development process.8 0 As a result, the
ILO and ISO agreed to a restrictive licensing arrangement for ILO to use the
standard under specified conditions with its constituents in situations where
ISO 26000 may affect the operations and activities of the constituents.
177. IOE, supra note 57, at 4 (quoting ISO 26000) (emphasis omitted). The IOE report-
ed that the Danish standards body was preparing a domestic standard for certification based on
ISO 26000. Id. It noted that national certification would perversely replace the core message
of ISO 26000 that an organization should carefully consider its responsible impacts rather than
substituting an empty certification. Id.
178. Press Release, ISO, It's Crystal Clear. No Certification to ISO 26000 Guidance
Standard on Social Responsibility (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/
pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref1378 (emphasis omitted).
179. E.g., GRI, GRI AND ISO 26000: How TO USE THE GRI GUIDELINES IN CONJUNC-
TION WITH ISO 26000 (2010), available at http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/
E5A54FE2-A056-4EF9-BC 1C-32B77F40ED34/0/ISOGRIReportFINAL.pdf; ACCOUNT
ABILITY, AAIooo STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT STANDARD 2011: FINAL EXPOSURE DRAFT
(2011), available at http://www.accountability.org/images/content/3/6/362/AAI OOOSES%20
2010%20PRINT.pdf.
180. ISO WGSR, Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO Doc. ISO/TMBI/WG SR N 55,
ISO/WD 26000 (Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://isotc.iso.org/livelinklivelink?func=ll&
objld=5167446&objAction=Open&vemum=l (bearing the phrase "© ISO 2006-All rights
reserved" on the cover).
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To the extent that representativity of stakeholders was sought, the very
restriction of the use of ISO 26000 belies its design and aim of complement-
ing public activity in the public interest. Follow-up action on ISO 26000 is
taken, in line with ISO's statutory practice, through decisions beyond the
public eye, and few avenues exist for stakeholders in communities at large
to be informed or to meaningfully participate in the ISO 26000 activities
that directly affect them. The lack of transparency and accountability in the
follow-up to ISO 26000 appears indeed to fall short of the principles of ac-
countability and transparency set out in ISO 26000 itself; an organization
should be transparent in its decisions and activities that affect society and
the environment and should be accountable for the effects it has on society,
the economy, and the environment.'81
IV. LEGAL AND POLICY CONTEXT FOR INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS RELATING TO PUBLIC POLICY
The development of ISO 26000 illustrates the new "leadership" ap-
proach to ISO standard setting that provokes fundamental questions about
the role of private standardization in areas of public policy and lawmaking
and about the function of private actors in global governance systems. In
2007, amid the process of developing ISO 26000, the ISO General Assem-
bly adopted the ISO Principles "to guide ISO and IEC committees
developing standards related to or supporting public policy initiatives."' 82
Although the expressed intent is to guide ISO in its work at the intersection
with public policy, the ISO Principles fail to provide the guidance needed to
decide when to use the private ISO standard-setting mechanism to address
issues involving public policy and how to develop and implement such
standards when they are justifiable. Internal controls are necessary to ensure
the effective compliance of ISO with its duties as a private actor in standard-
ization; those duties include respecting human rights and other principles
fundamental to the rule of law and ensuring the legitimacy, transparency,
and accountability of ISO's decisions as is similarly expected of it under the
legal standards of the WTO relating to the TBT Agreement.
The self-avowed objective of the ISO Principles is to ensure that ISO
standards "can properly support and be used by public authorities." ''1 3 The
underlying policy, which is considered "a reasonable goal," is to "make their
portfolio of standards more visible to public authorities and, equally im-
portant, ensure that its standards address the relevant needs and concerns of
the public authorities."'8 4 The ISO Principles recognize that private
181. E.g., WGSR DIS, supra note 134, §§ 4.2-3.
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voluntary organizations like ISO and its partner organization, IEC, 5  are
"not directly representative of government interests" and that "[n]ational po-
sitions on ISO or IEC standards are not necessarily government positions,
although government experts may participate in developing the positions."' 86
Nonetheless, the ISO Principles assert that it has been shown "that ISO and
IEC standards are capable of providing valuable support to the implementa-
tion of public policy."'187 The section on "Background Context" describes the
ISO mandate as providing "voluntary standards that support the programs of
government authorities, who need standards that meet the WTO TBT crite-
ria and that support technical regulations and/or procurement actions."'88
Four general points emerge from the ISO Principles themselves. Stand-
ards related to or supporting public policy initiatives should (1) be based on
objective information and knowledge on which there is global consensus,
not subjective judgments; (2) not seek to establish, drive, or motivate public
policy, regulations, or social and political agendas; (3) not supplant the role
of governments or treaty organizations; and (4) follow existing operational
approaches and participation models already in the ISO/IEC Directives.' 89 In
the implementation section, the ISO Principles further affirm that "ISO and
IEC shall actively support and promote the principles for international
standardization established in the WTO TBT Agreement and subsequent de-
cisions of the TBT Committee regarding the development of international
standards."'9 0
Although the ISO Principles refer to providing international standards
in line with the TBT Agreement,' 9 ' ISO's procedures to secure such a
result-and the actual exercise of its discretion in areas relating to public
policy-reveal the need for significant reform of ISO's decision making, de-
velopment, and implementation in relation to its "leadership" standards. The
TBT Agreement serves as the primary international instrument addressing
the role of international standardization in the context of domestic technical
regulations. Under the Standards Code in the predecessor framework of the
185. For general information on the IEC, see generally IEC, http://www.iec.ch (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2012).
186. ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 1.
187. Id.
188. Id. For a description of the TBT criteria, see infra notes 191-200 and accompany-
ing text.
189. ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 1-2.
190. Id. at 2 (Implementation). For the TBT Committee decision establishing criteria for
developing international standards, see infra note 197.
191. ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 1-2. In the Background Context section, ISO
states that it has been and will "continue to be [an] effective provider[] of voluntary standards
that support the programs of government authorities, who need standards that meet the WTO
TBT criteria." Id. at 1. In the Implementation section, ISO states that it "shall actively support
and promote the principles for international standardization established in the WTO TBT
Agreement." Id. at 2. For the TBT Agreement, see supra note 140.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 9 2 ISO committed itself to
follow the principles that now underlie the current Code of Good Practice
for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards annexed to the
TBT (TBT Code of Good Practice). 93 Under the TBT Code of Good Prac-
tice, parties commit to avoiding the creation of unnecessary obstacles to
international trade and, importantly, to using relevant international stand-
ards, where they exist or are imminent, as a basis for developing private
standards. 94 The ISO Principles reaffirm ISO's intention to actively support
the commitments in fields relating to or supporting public policy initiatives
and to ensure that ISO's standardization activities do not hinder, but indeed
support, the programs of governments by providing standards that meet the
WTO TBT Agreement criteria.
ISO's reference to the TBT Agreement criteria in the ISO Principles im-
plies that, for ISO, the TBT Code of Good Practice commitment extends
beyond standardization activities that fall strictly within the scope of the TBT
Agreement's provisions and applies also to standardization in public policy
fields beyond the TBT Agreement. 195 This implication contrasts with the uni-
lateral declaration of ISO that ISO 26000 was not an "international standard"
for purposes of the Marrakesh Agreement (to the extent its provisions covered
192. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
193. TBT Agreement, supra note 140, Annex 3 (Code of Good Practice). Since 1979,
under the TBT Agreement's predecessor code, "ISO has taken the commitment and imple-
mented all the necessary measures to ensure that ISO's International Standards are fully
compliant with the requirements set by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of the
WTO*" The Establishment of the GATT Standards Code, ISO, http://www.iso.orgliso/aboutl
thejiso-story/iso-story-gatt standardscode.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). The plurilateral
Standards Code of the GATT was superseded by the multilateral TBT Agreement in the
framework of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. TBT
Agreement, supra note 140. A Ministerial Decision taken in Marrakesh recommended that the
WTO enter into an MoU with ISO to establish an information system to receive notifications
of commitment by standardizing bodies to the Code of Good Practice. WTO, Uruguay Round
Ministerial Decision on Proposed Understanding on WTO-ISO Standards Information System,
adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee on Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 66, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal e/37-dtbtl.pdf. The WTO and ISO subsequently agreed to an MoU on
the subject, and the ISO General Assembly adopted a resolution "commit[ting] itself to pro-
moting positive responses to the provisions of the WTO TBT Code of Good Practice ...
regarding information on standards development." WTO TBT Committee, Minutes of the
Meeting Held on 21 April 1995, 47, TBT/M/48 (June 28, 1995), available at http://www.
wto.org/gatt-docs/English/HTM/M48.WPF.htm.
194. TBT Agreement, supra note 140, Annex 3, E, H.
195. By its terms, the TBT "deals only with technical regulations, standards and con-
formity assessment procedures related to products or process and production methods"
(PPMs), id. Annex 1, 2, and expressly excludes services and mandatory standards. It further
recognizes that the terms, as defined in ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, also cover services and man-
datory as well as voluntary standards. See id.
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SR in processes and production methods (PPMs)). 19 6 In any event, it is not
ISO but the WTO, and possibly other international organizations, that would
likely have (or share) the authority to decide whether the TBT and other
international legal regimes apply to ISO's actions in developing and imple-
menting ISO 26000. Even when an ISO international standard may not
come under the definition of an "international standard" for purposes of the
TBT Agreement, 97 the TBT Agreement criteria and framework lend useful
guidance, whether directly or by analogy, to the way in which ISO should
exercise its discretion in fields relating to public policy.
198
The consensus that, along with personal liberties under law, private ac-
tors have duties and are responsible for the effects of their actions on others
operates as a motivating principle in international and domestic legal sys-
tems.' 99  This principle underlies the specialized international legal
framework for international standardization within the Marrakesh Agree-
ment,2°° for which ISO plays a distinctive role in facilitating trade and
business activity through private standardization.2"' The TBT Agreement of-
fers a principled framework for coordinating public and private actors in
standardization to the extent that its underlying aim is "to ensure that tech-
nical regulations and standards ... and procedures for assessment of
conformity with technical regulations and standards do not create unneces-
196. In its scope provision, ISO 26000 expressly states that "for purposes of the Marra-
kech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) it is not intended to be
interpreted as an 'international standard,' 'guideline' or 'recommendation,' nor is it intended
to provide a basis for any presumption or finding that a measure is consistent with WTO obli-
gations." Ward, supra note 137, at 701 (quoting ISO 26000, supra note 2, at 157-63). See also
supra note 141 and accompanying text.
197. The term "International standard" under the TBT is defined as follows:
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and re-
peated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and
production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include
or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling re-
quirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.
TBT Agreement, supra note 140, Annex 1, 2. The note that follows the definition explains
that standards "as defined by ISO/IEC Guide 2 cover products, processes and services" while
the TBT Agreement deals only with "products or processes and production methods." Id.
198. See infra Conclusion and Next Steps.
199. For a review of international legal sources, and constitutional and other national le-
gal provisions pertaining to duties and responsibilities of the individual in relation to the state,
see generally Special Rapporteur of the Subcomm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot.
of Minorities, The Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights
and Freedoms Under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Contribu-
tion to the Freedom of the Individual Under Law, 66-170, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev. 2 (1983) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes) [hereinafter Limitations on Human
Rights and Freedoms Under Article 29].
200. See TBT Agreement, supra note 140.
201. See supra note 193 (discussing the MoU between ISO and WTO).
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sary obstacles to international trade. '2°2 The TBT Agreement and its Code of
Good Practice, to which ISO and many of its member bodies have commit-
ted themselves,2"3 together shape the framework within which such
international standardization is deemed appropriate. Reflecting the policy of
autonomy left to WTO members, the TBT Agreement recognizes the right
of a country to take certain necessary and self-protective measures.204 Other
provisions commit members to give one another advice and technical assis-
tance on standardization matters and to ensure that the standardizing bodies
in each territory give effect to the provisions of the Code of Good Prac-
tice.20 5 Under the TBT Code of Good Practice, private actors commit to
national and equal treatment for products from any other WTO member ter-
ritory. Private actors also commit to duties not to prepare, adopt, or apply
standards with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obsta-
cles to international trade; to use relevant international standards as a basis
for the development of standards where they exist or their completion is
imminent; to avoid duplication or overlap with the work of other standardiz-
ing bodies, including at the international level; and to achieve a national
consensus on the standards they develop.
2 6
In a landmark decision in 2000, the WTO TBT Committee issued a Deci-
sion of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International
Standards, Guides and Recommendations with relation to Articles 2 and 5 and
Annex 3 of the Agreement (TBT Principles).2 0 7 The TBT Principles include
guidance for international standards bodies when developing international
standards, guides, and recommendations, including voluntary standards like
those elaborated by ISO.28 Their aim is "to ensure transparency, openness,
202. TBT Agreement, supra note 140, pmbl.
203. See supra note 193.
204. See TBT Agreement, supra note 140, pmbl., art. 2.2. The provision reads, in perti-
nent part:
[N]o country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the
quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health,
of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices . . . subject to the
requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
Id. pmbl.
205. Id. arts. 4, 11.
206. Id. Annex 3, IT D-H.
207. WTO TBT Comm., Second Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 4, G/TBT/9 (Nov. 13, 2000) [herein-
after Second Triennial Review]. The Decision of the Committee on Principles for the
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to Arti-
cles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement, is reported in this annex.
208. See id. Annex 4. The Decision addresses principles and procedures to be observed
when elaborating international standards, guides, and recommendations as mentioned under
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impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, coherence, and to
address the concerns of developing countries.""2 9 In annexing the Principles,
the WTO TBT Committee stressed that:
In order for international standards to make a maximum contribu-
tion to the achievement of the trade facilitating objectives of the
[TBT] Agreement, it was important that all Members had the
opportunity to participate in the elaboration and adoption of inter-
national standards. Adverse trade effects might arise from standards
emanating from international bodies as defined in the Agreement
which had no procedures for soliciting input from a wide range of
interests. Bodies operating with open, impartial and transparent
procedures, that afforded an opportunity for consensus among all
interested parties in the territories of at least all Members, were
seen as more likely to develop standards which were effective and
relevant on a global basis and would thereby contribute to the goal
of the Agreement to prevent unnecessary obstacles to trade. 1°
The TBT Principles emphasize six main issues: transparency, openness,
impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, coherence, and the
participation of developing countries. As to transparency, the Principles state
that "[a]ll essential information regarding current work programmes ...
should be made easily accessible to at least all interested parties." '' As to
impartiality and consensus, the Principles provide that, throughout the
standards development process, "meaningful opportunities" to contribute
should be available to all relevant bodies of WTO members, 22 and "impar-
tiality should be accorded" in relation to "access to participation in work;
submission of comments on drafts; consideration of views expressed and
comments made; decision-making through consensus; ... dissemination of
the international standard; fees charged for documents; ... and revision of
the international standard. '213 As to effectiveness and relevance, the TBT
Principles provide that international standards are "to effectively respond to
regulatory and market needs" and not "distort the global market" or "give
preference to ... specific countries or regions. '214 In emphasizing coherence
and the need to "avoid development of conflicting international standards,"
the TBT Principles state that "it is important that international standardizing
bodies avoid duplication of, or overlap with, the work of other international
standardizing bodies. In this respect, cooperation and coordination with oth-
Articles 2, 5, and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement for the preparation of mandatory technical
regulations, conformity assessment procedures, and voluntary standards. Id. Annex 4, 1.
209. Id.
210. Second Triennial Review, supra note 207, T 20.






er relevant international bodies is essential. 215 In an implicit reference to the
limited access and capacity that pose obstacles for developing country
participants in standardization processes, the TBT Principles require that
developing countries not be "excluded de facto from the process.
216
Along with the lex specialis217 of the TBT Agreement, other fields of in-
ternational law (in particular human rights law) impose not only
responsibility on governments to protect against private abuses, but also im-
pose horizontal duties on private actors to assume responsibility for effects
of their actions on other private actors. The principle of mutuality, which
motivates the foundational instrument of modem human rights law, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 218 recognizes that everyone,
including private persons, has a duty to respect the rights of others. 219 The
UDHR proclaims that "every individual and every organ of society" is to
"promote respect for these rights and freedoms ... [and] secure their univer-
sal and effective recognition and observance. '220 In particular, the exercise
of each person's rights and freedoms are "subject only to such limitations as
are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just re-
quirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society."221 In any event, an individual's "rights and freedoms may in no
215. Id. AJ12.
216. Id.[ 13.
217. Lex specialis refers to a body of law that governs a specific subject matter, which,
under rules of legal interpretation, prevails in case of conflict with law of a general nature. The
scope and application of the doctrine, lex specialis derogat legi generali, are the subject of on-
going debate. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
94-108, 385-417 (2003); Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal
System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 27 (2005). This situation, how-
ever, presents no conflict as commonly understood in legal theory, and the law of human
rights, which includes customary andjus cogens norms, would continue to apply together with
the special provisions of the TBT Agreement relevant to ISO.
218. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc
AIRES/217(III), pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. The principle of horizontal duties
is recognized in the UDHR and further elaborated in international and regional human fights
treaties and declarations. See infra note 219. The correlation between rights, on the one hand,
and duties of individuals and of society, on the other hand, was recognized and developed ex-
tensively in the foundational inquiry that informed the drafting of the UDHR. E.g., John
Lewis, On Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 54, 56 (U.N.
Educ. Sci. & Cultural Org. ed., Greenwood Press 1973) (1948).
219. See, e.g., Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms Under Article 29, supra note
199, $ 230; ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 1, 140 (1993);
Richard McKeon, The Philosophic Bases and Material Circumstances of the Rights of Man, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 218, at 35, 45.
220. UDHR, supra note 218, pmbl. This proclamation by the U.N. General Assembly is
reinforced in the reference to "member of society" in Article 22. Id. art. 22; see JANELLE
DILLER, SECURING DIGNITY AND FREEDOM THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS: ARTICLE 22 OF THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 29-30, 45-46 & 121 (2012).
221. UDHR, supra note 218, art. 29(2).
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case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations." '222 The UDHR's emphasis on individual rights and duties has been
elaborated in subsequent international human rights treaties and
declarations, including the international covenants on human rights, which
recognize specifically that the individual has duties to other individuals and
to the community, and a responsibility to strive for the promotion and ob-
servance of the rights recognized in the international covenants.223
In its responsibility to ensure against private abuses under international
human rights law, public authority has obligations to directly protect indi-
viduals from the infringement of their human rights by other nonstate actors,
including business and other NGOs, such as ISO. Private standardization re-
lating to public policy may not explicitly discriminate, for example, on the
basis of race, sex, economic or social status, or other prohibited grounds.
Nonetheless, where standards have that effect, such disparate impact would
come within the proscription of international human rights law and, in par-
ticular, widely ratified treaties recognizing states' obligations to ensure
nondiscrimination in both public and private spheres.224 In cases of disparate
impact, the country in which the discriminatory effect occurs would thus be
obligated to remedy the discrimination and eliminate its ongoing effect.225
222. Id. art. 29(3).
223. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR];
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pmbl., opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
224. See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 1(2)-(3), 13(1)(b), 55(c), 76(c); ICCPR, supra note
223, arts. 2(1), 3, 26; ICESCR, supra note 223, art. 2(2); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination arts. 1(4), 2(2), opened for signature Mar.
7, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Rights of the Child
art. 2, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees art. 3, openedfor signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; ILO Convention No.
100 Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value
art. 3, adopted June 29, 1951, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C100; tLO Conven-
tion No. 111 Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation art. 2,
adopted June 25, 1958, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C 11; ILO Convention
No. 156 Concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers:
Workers with Family Responsibilities art. 3, adopted June 23, 1981, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
cgi-lex/convde.pl?C156; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of Their Families art. 7, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1990,
2220 U.N.T.S. 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 27(3), adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 75(1),
adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
225. As explained by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination created under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, "[a] distinction is contrary to the Convention if it has either the purpose or the
effect of impairing particular rights and freedoms. This is confirmed by the obligation placed
upon States parties by article 2, paragraph 1 (c), to nullify any law or practice which has the
effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination." U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
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The international legal duties to respect the human rights of others22 6 apply
to all private actors, including private standards bodies such as ISO. As gen-
erally applicable rules of international law, these duties cover all
standardizing action, including action within the scope of specialized re-
gimes such as the TBT Agreement, and impose on standards bodies a
responsibility to ensure that their activities do not infringe on or result in in-
jury to the rights of others.
V. ISO EXERCISE IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT
The application of the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement and
the WTO TBT Committee's interpretative principles, as well as the general
rules of international human rights law,227 demonstrate that several funda-
mental safeguards are lacking in ISO's approach to standards development
and action in fields of public policy. In their decision-making, development,
and implementation phases, ISO policies and procedures need reevaluation
in light of the TBT requirements to ensure that any initial decision and sub-
sequent development by ISO of international standards affecting public
policy meet the TBT Committee's threshold international principles of
transparency, openness (meaningful participation), impartiality and consen-
sus, effectiveness and relevance, and coherence, and meet the imperative to
address the concerns of developing countries.
22
1
The first area for improvement involves the criteria and process that ISO
uses to make decisions to develop standards in fields that largely concern
public policy. At present, the system does not take sufficient account of
relevant regulatory needs, as required for private standards under the TBT
Agreement and its related Principles on developing international standards.
Under the TBT Code of Good Practice, "[wlhere international standards ex-
ist or their completion is imminent, the standardizing body shall use them,
or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for the standards it develops" '229 so as
to avoid duplication or overlap with the work of other standardizing bodies,
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 14: Definition of Discrim-
ination (Art. 1, para. 1), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9 (Vol. H) (May 27, 2008). This approach
has been adapted generally to the obligations of states in relation to the right to nondiscrimina-
tion under international human rights law. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, 2, 6-7, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (May
27, 2008).
226. See supra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
227. For lex specialis, see supra notes 191-216 and accompanying text. To the extent
that ISO activity extends beyond the scope of the TBT Agreement, as was arguably the case
with various aspects of ISO 26000, it could be that standardizing bodies have no further direct
obligations to governments in relation to the TBT Code of Good Practice. However, interna-
tional human rights law and other sources of international law apply to impose duties on both
governments and their national member bodies for action affecting the rights of others, even
beyond the lex specialis of the TBT. See supra notes 218-224 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 210-216 and accompanying text (discussing TBT Principles).
229. See TBT Agreement, supra note 140, Annex 3, F.
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including at the international level.2 3° The TBT Principles on developing in-
ternational standards further provide, in relation to effectiveness and
relevance, that international standardizing bodies "take account of relevant
regulatory or market needs, as feasible and appropriate, as well as scientific
and technological developments in the elaboration of standards. '231 In con-
trast, the ISO decision-making process is driven nearly entirely by market
needs; regulatory needs serve primarily as background context.23 2 The ISO
Principles speak to creating "market-driven International Standards" that are
"market relevant" and "based on objective information and knowledge on
which there is global consensus, and not on subjective judgments.
'233
This approach draws on an earlier ISO adaptation of the TBT Principles
from 2004. In referring to the TBT principle on effectiveness and relevance,
the ISO/TMB coined the term "globally relevant standard" in its own state-
ment of policy and principles. 23 4 These 2004 ISO/TMB principles require
that the "commitment to participate in the development of and the feasibility
of preparing International Standards shall be demonstrated at the outset of a
standards development project." '235 Under this principle, one of three possi-
bilities guides the determination of whether and how to enter a new field of
private standardization activity. The possibilities consist of whether
a globally relevant international Standard presenting one unique in-
ternational solution in all of its provisions is feasible; an
International Standard is feasible that presents options in specific
provisions to accommodate existing and legitimate market differ-
ences where justified; or the preparation of a globally relevant
International Standard is not feasible and work should not be under-
taken in such circumstances.
2 3 6
230. Id. I H.
231. Second Triennial Review, supra note 207, Annex 4, 11.
232. See, e.g., ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at I ("ISO and IEC are committed to
creating market-driven International Standards, based on objective information and knowledge
on which there is global consensus, and not on subjective judgments, in order to provide cred-
ible technical tools that can support the implementation of regulation and public policy
initiatives.").
233. Id.
234. ISO, ISO/TMB POLICY AND PRINCIPLES STATEMENT: GLOBAL RELEVANCE OF ISO
TECHNICAL WORK AND PUBLICATIONS § 1 (2004), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/global-
relevance of iso technicalwork.andpublications.pdf. The ISO/TMB Global Relevance
Statement was based on the work of a Global Relevance Task Force established by the
ISO/TMB at the request of the ISO Council. Id. The ISO/TMB defined global relevance as the
"required characteristic of an International Standard that it can be used/implemented as broad-
ly as possible by affected industries and other stakeholders in markets around the world." Id.
§ 2.




Notably, the references to a "unique international solution" and "exist-
ing and legitimate market differences" are presented solely in a market
context:
It is recognized that in some instances various solutions exist to
meet unique aspects of the local markets in different regions and
countries. With globalization and the unification of markets, these
market differences should be minimized over time and evolve into
one global market. Simply projecting one solution that accommo-
dates one market (but not others) as the International Standard will
not force markets to evolve and coalesce. In such cases, the markets
and their related industries will look elsewhere for standards that
better accommodate their needs, and ISO will lose its relevance for
those markets and industries.
23 7
At the outset, a distinctive balance, taking account of both market and
public interests, must be found to properly assess the need for private stand-
ardization in fields of public policy. The current models for market-driven
diagnoses of the need for private standardization in fields of public policy
miss the distinction between the knowledge process that drives market
innovation and the processes that drive policy and lawmaking in democratic
systems. Without this distinction, the appropriate balance between the roles
of private and public decision making is lost. The processes for public poli-
cy making and legislation that are based on the will of the people238 are
expressed most evidently in democratic systems grounded on judgments of
public interest informed by representative consultations and decided by
accountable officials. These processes do not necessarily rely only on objec-
tive information or market incentives, unlike the guiding parameters for
developing international standards relating to public policy that are set out
in the ISO Principles.23 9
To secure the aim of coherence as envisioned in the TBT Principles, the
ISO approach to public policy should specify how to ensure appropriate
boundaries for private standardization in fields that call for due deference to
publicly established norms. At present, this is not the case, either in princi-
ple or in practice. Although the ISO Principles affirm that "the
development of regulation, public policy and/or the development and
interpretation of international treaties are the role of governments or treaty
organizations, ' 2 40 the means for ensuring coherence with this principle rest
merely on the guideline that private standardization should proceed "with-
out seeking to establish, drive or motivate public policy, regulations, or
237. Id.
238. UDHR, supra note 218, art. 21(3) ("The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government .... ).
239. See ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103. For details, see supra notes 182-190 and ac-
companying text.
240. ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 1.
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social and political agendas.""24 This formulation leaves unaddressed the
possibility of de facto impact where compulsory market influences from a
standard may affect the achievement of public policy or regulatory goals.
In contrast, the means in the TBT Principles for ensuring coherence are
firm: duplication and overlap with other international standards is to be
avoided, and "cooperation and coordination with other relevant internation-
al bodies is essential. 1242 This elaboration is based on the obligation in the
TBT Code of Good Practice to avoid overlap or duplication. 243 As discussed
below, means should be explored for identifying how to adequately ensure
that private standardization does not result in overlapping and inconsistent
subject matter with preexisting public norms. 244 Such an approach, which
will avoid moving ahead where there is doubt expressed by governments di-
rectly or through international organizations, will ensure against hindering,
in principle or practice, the sovereignty of states exercised in a representa-
tive and accountable manner.
The second general area for reform involves the procedures to ensure
meaningful participation of all governments concerned where private inter-
national standardization may add value to a field of public policy that is
already regulated. Adequate measures should be developed in a suitable fo-
rum that includes those states whose standardizing bodies participate in ISO
to ensure a proper operational balance between public authority and private
action. The ISO Principles, and their effect as demonstrated in the context of
developing ISO 26000, fell short of the thresholds for transparency, open-
ness, and impartiality set out in the TBT Principles. 24' This is due in part to
the mismatch between the vast public arenas sought to be addressed and the
inherently private, closed nature of ISO's structures and ways of working.
246
The ISO Principles themselves aim only to ensure that the potential for con-
flicting agendas can be avoided by a clear understanding of the relationship
between the standard and the public policy initiative and by early interven-
tion of public authorities in the standards development process. 247 The ISO
26000 experience shows that, when ISO standards require reference to or
use of authoritative international instruments, it is the public authorities, ex-
pending often-scarce public resources, that are expected to reformulate and
rearticulate public standards in a private forum.24 The private forum brings
241. Id.
242. Second Triennial Review, supra note 207, Annex 4, 1 12.
243. TBT Agreement, supra note 140, Annex 3, H.
244. See infra notes 257-266 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See supra Part III.C.
247. See ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 1.
248. See id. ("[T]he intervention of the public authorities in the standards development
process should occur as early as possible.... [I]n many cases experts representing regulatory




not only different actors but different processes that diverge from the
guarantees of representativity, transparency, and accountability to which the
exercise of public authority typically is held. In contrast, the approach of the
TBT Agreement offers a method for balancing public sector inputs where
needed in international standardization activity, requiring that WTO
"[m]embers shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the
preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of internation-
al standards for products for which they either have adopted, or expect to
adopt, technical regulations."24 9 To ensure such a "full part" result, a
preemptive right of public authoritative action could be recognized and op-
erate with ISO in much the same way that other private actors are required
to defer to public authority in national and international contexts.2 10 Criti-
cisms of the lack of sufficient deference surfaced in the elaboration of ISO
26000 as governments demanded that simple references to treaty texts re-
place the WGSR attempts to reword the texts in ways that could "reinterpret,
mischaracterize or misstate" their content.
21'
In launching a new "leadership" series of standards, ISO faces a set of
new roles, responsibilities, and interactions for which modified approaches
of working are essential. Nonetheless, the ISO Principles defer to existing
operational approaches and participation structures and directives that have
been used successfully in the development of technical standards based on
objective knowledge and use of experts, a model that may not necessarily
apply effectively to the fields of public policy in which ISO is interested. As
a further impediment, the ISO Principles specifically propose to avoid "the
use of special committee structures, procedures or participation models" as
these "may compromise ... credibility and suitability."2 52 Such an approach
249. TBT Agreement, supra note 140, art. 2.6. Technical regulations, as defined in the
TBT Agreement, are mandatory and deal only with product characteristics or their related
PPMs, including terminology, symbols, packaging, marking, or labeling requirements as they
apply to a PPM. By its terms, the TBT "deals only with technical regulations, standards and
conformity assessment procedures related to products or processes and production methods"
and expressly excludes services and mandatory standards. Id. Annex 1, art. 2. It further recog-
nizes that the terms as defined in ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991 also cover services and mandatory as
well as voluntary standards. Id.
250. See supra notes 221-224 and accompanying text (discussing human rights obliga-
tions under national and international law).
251. E.g., Ward, supra note 137, at 702 (quoting the U.S. Trade Representative's submis-
sion to the sixth WGSR meeting).
252. ISO PRINCtPLES, supra note 103, at 2. According to ISO, its standards are devel-
oped on the basis of the principles of industry-wide consensus and voluntary involvement of
all marketplace interests, including manufacturers, vendors, users, consumer groups, testing
laboratories, governments, engineering professions, and research organizations. Id. at 1; cf
ISO/IEC DIRECTIVES, supra note 77, §§ 1.17.2.2, 1.17.3.2. The standards development
process is governed by specific rules defined in the ISO/JEC Directives. Id. § 2. This approach
may have arisen from the experience of the MoUs with the ILO, U.N. Global Compact, and
the OECD. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text. As discussed above, the ILO-ISO
MoU granted a status distinct from D-liaison organizations under the ISO rules. In so doing,
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presumes that models and structures that have worked in highly technical
contexts will also succeed in public policy oriented spheres, even though the
processes and types of dialogue are distinct from each other. Where highly
technical or scientific subject matter must be agreed upon, breadth and
diversity of expertise is required. However, where public policy is
concerned, a different type of consultation is needed in order to serve the
democratic mandate. This consultation involves representative stakeholders,
meaningfully informed of the issues, whose authority derives, not from
individual expertise, but from their status as duly elected representatives of
the community they serve. Expert dialogue is evident in the "case studies of
successful ... standards efforts that support public policy initiatives" cited
in the ISO Principles relating to "medical devices and greenhouse gas
emissions, and IEC standards related to radio interference, safety of
household appliances, [and] ships and marine technology.' 53 These cases
exemplify ISO's "valuable support to the implementation of public
policy 25 4 through international standards involving situations where
established scientific and technical purposes and techniques were applied to
complement a broader public purpose established by public authority.
ISO 26000 was of a fundamentally different nature in both its
orientation and scope. ISO's decision at the start to shift from CSR,
addressing market actors, to SR, 255 addressing all organizations in society,
diluted the exercise's focus on market needs. It further encouraged an
expansive coverage of subject matter already well developed in relevant
international standards in the public sphere that, for the most part, did not
require technical or scientific expertise, unlike the examples listed above.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR A LEGALLY SUSTAINABLE FRAMEWORK
The interaction of private standardization and public policy should be
structured in a way to avoid situations where, in areas of publicly estab-
lished consensus, a new consensus is sought by means of a privately
convened process that, unlike public processes, cannot be fully representa-
tive of the interests of society. The result, demonstrated by ISO 26000, tends
to review and recast the original decisions of the publicly convened repre-
sentative stakeholders by requiring the consensus of a new set of actors with
a less representative composition and operating under different procedures
and for different purposes.25 6 Such scenarios present a genuine risk of com-
promising the public democratic processes based on the rule of law by
other international organizations sought and were granted similarly specific accords within the
two years following the start of the process. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
253. See ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 2.
254. Id. at 1.
255. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the single dissenting voice
upon the Advisory Group's recommendation for SR, not CSR).
256. See the discussion on representativity and procedures, supra Part III.A-B.
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requiring a new consensus between public actors broadly representing the
community and private actors representing various stakeholders con-
cerned-a consensus that adds little or no value and poses a potential risk to
the democratic process of law and policy making. In addition, a system of
privatized standardization based on public mandates and processes neces-
sarily would not serve the value of complementarity between the privatized
standardization process and public policies. The proposals for a way for-
ward focus on an appropriate articulation and coordination of both public
and private roles in standardization.
This review of the ISO 26000 journey concludes that ISO did not suffi-
ciently develop and apply the necessary criteria to justify its decisions to
proceed with private standardization in the field of SR or to define the scope
of and processes for developing such a standard. 257 ISO's decisions to seek
international standardization in the field of SR, and to use particular pro-
cesses, both ad hoc and those established for technical standards, should be
reevaluated within a framework of laws and other rules applicable to the ac-
tors involved, particularly ISO and its national member bodies. Novel
paradigms emerge in examining whether the decision to seek international
standardization in the field of SR, especially for all organizations, was justi-
fiable in its aim and purpose, and whether the rules applied to "convene"
public actors to debate and renegotiate public policy outcomes in the devel-
opment of a private international standard were appropriate in the particular
context.
One possible solution would be the operation of a presumption for pub-
lic preemption of subjects relating to public policy. Upon initial review of
the need for a private standard by those interested in developing one, an ex-
ercise in due diligence would seek to ensure that the negative duty not to
harm publicly established common standards would be respected. Further
questions about what type of showing would be sufficient to overcome the
presumption, at both international and national levels of standardizing activ-
ity, would need to be settled, perhaps by resorting to the international
institutions concerned. A standardized international-level mechanism for
consultation with states, collectively and through international organizations
concerned, might achieve predictability and transparency currently lacking
in the ad hoc relationship agreements between ISO and various international
institutions.258 In addition, the approach of complementarity between public
and private actors embedded in the TBT Agreement should lead to consider-
ation of what further arrangements could ensure that private standardization
257. For the process used by ISO to review the need for developing ISO 26000, see su-
pra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
258. See the discussion of the MoU variances, supra Part III.B.3. For a list of organiza-
tions cooperating with ISO, including international organizations, see Organizations in
Cooperation with ISO, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/organizations in_liaison.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2012). For further discussion of the preemption approach, see infra Conclusion
and Next Steps.
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initiatives outside the scope of the TBT Agreement would add value rather
than overlap or conflict with public consensus on matters of public policy.
Ironically, ISO 26000 itself acknowledges that all actors, private as well
as public, have duties to each other and to society; this general principle mo-
tivates both the standard's scope and originating purpose.259 In justifying its
decision to develop a new standard in the field of SR of all organizations,
ISO contended that there was an urgent need to address the "market confu-
sion that may be caused by the steadily increasing number of SR
initiatives. '260 However, its further conclusions that such confusion would be
remedied by an SR standard applicable to all organizations 26 and that such
a standard would facilitate international trade and business, left unanswered
the question whether private international standardization is appropriate
where a wide number of common rules are already applicable at the interna-
tional level. Overlap and duplication between public and private efforts,
which are to be avoided under the TBT Agreement framework for coordina-
tion, were significantly visible even at the start of work on ISO 26000.262
Indeed, the NWIP gave undue emphasis to the fact that a suggestion to
avoid legal terrain in the development of the new standard was not accepted
by the Advisory Group as a whole.2 63 Beyond a general reference to "market
confusion that may be caused by the steadily increasing number of SR initi-
atives," the ISO justification for pursuing an SR standard did not specify
what sort of market need justified standardization in situations where public
259. ISO 26000 itself defines "social responsibility" as the "responsibility of an organi-
zation for the impacts of its decisions and activities on society and the environment, through
transparent and ethical behaviour that ... contributes to sustainable development, including
the health and the welfare of society ...." WGSR DIS, supra note 134, § 2.1.18 (internal cita-
tions omitted) (in pertinent part, placement and wording unchanged in adopted standard).
While there is no consensus on the meaning and function of "fundamental" or "general" prin-
ciples, it is generally agreed that certain basic principles underlying international law serve as
motivating influences that, in legal terms, guide the course of future normative development.
See generally, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-31 (4th
ed. 1990); BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 6-21 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1953); JEAN PICTET, HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 28-30 (1975); OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49-61 (1991); see also Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice art. 38(l)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (describing
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as a source of international law).
260. NWIP, supra note 35.
261. Id. Annex A, § 3. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
262. See supra Part III.C.
263. NWIP, supra note 35, Annex B, §§ a, c. In this section on purpose and justification
for the proposed standard, the ISO Secretariat reviewed the recommendations of the Advisory
Group on preconditions as well as scope of work and type of deliverables. In addressing issues
that might affect the feasibility of the standardization activity as identified by the Advisory
Group in its report, the NWIP had excessively spotlighted the WGSR's observation that the
"indication that ISO should address what is non-legal (leaving the legal issues to




authoritative instruments have legislated common international standards,
leaving particular elements to individual country governments to regulate.2 6
The ISO Principles, which were adopted several years after the decision to
develop an SR standard, noted the need for standards to provide "valuable
support to the implementation of public policy. '265 In this light, the devel-
opment of ISO 26000 should have been designed as complementary to,
rather than competitive with, the elaboration of public policy.
Along with the question of the purpose of private standardization in a
public policy field is the question of process, whose importance grows in di-
rect proportion to the degree of incursion by the private standardizing body
into public policy and legal territory. The issue of the lack of representativity
of the group creating the standard would not necessarily have arisen if ex-
pertise in technical affairs, rather than a democratic social policy setting,
had been the primary input to the standardization process. 26 6 Although, in
principle, the stakeholder categories applied by the NSBs represented an ef-
fort to achieve a national consensus on the developing standard in line with
the commitments of the TBT Agreement, in practice the representativity of
the process was severely challenged by those in the process who believed
that selection based on stakeholder categories could not produce legitima-
cy.2 67 The justification for such a challenge to the ISO 26000 process toward
"private governance" derives from the established principle of popular par-
ticipation, which has been recognized as a political right relevant in the
process of economic and social development. 268 The election and accredita-
tion process inherent to democratic government selection, and to
authentication of representatives in delegations to international institutional
decision making,269 contrasts dramatically with the democratic deficit of the
264. NWIP, supra note 35, Annex B, § d.
265. ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 1.
266. See generally supra Part III.A.
267. See TBT Agreement, supra note 140, Annex 3, H.
268. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 40/99, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/99 (Dec. 13, 1985) (recog-
nizing that "popular participation ... constitutes an important factor in socio-economic
development and in the full realization of all human rights"); World Summit for Social Devel-
opment, Copenhagen, Den., Mar. 6-12, 1995, Copenhagen Declaration on Social
Development and Programme of Action, Annex 1, § 71(h), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 166/9 (Apr. 19,
1995); see also Catherine E. Rudder, Private Governance as Public Policy: A Paradigmatic
Shift, 70 J. POL. 899, 900 (2008).
269. The interest shown by ISO in ILO's accreditation process for its nongovernmental
representatives was genuine but could not change the fundamental procedure on which ISO
relied: selection by its member bodies without supervision or control in a central fashion as
ILO does in complying with its own constitutional requirements for accreditation of govern-
mental selection of nongovernmental delegates to the International Labour Conference.
Compare supra note 56 and accompanying text (stating that ISO members' selection of ex-
perts for standards development was subject to ISO guidance but ultimately within their own
discretion), with ILO, CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION art. 3,
1 (2010) (stating that ILO Member States have legal responsibility to appoint four-member
delegations, two governmental delegates and two delegates representative of employers and
workers of the country), and ILO, STANDING ORDERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
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private standards procedure in relation to public policy making. As a conse-
quence of this democratic deficit, the ISO rules relating to consensus (a core
principle that is, on its face, neutral when technical, "objective" knowledge
may be useful) fall short when applied to a nonrepresentative composition
under rules and structures created by appointment rather than selection by
representative bodies.270
The development of ISO 26000 also poses the question of who bears re-
sponsibility for both the standard itself and its effects. It is possible, as was
the case for ISO 26000, that the content of the standard, at the exact moment
of publication, may be deemed acceptable by many governments and IGOs
in relation to the corresponding aims recognized in international authorita-
tive instruments. However, because international law and public policy
continually evolve, and are applied by actors holding representative authori-
ty, the normative parity in content between the two spheres may erode
rapidly. As normative parity erodes, the value of the ISO standard is deplet-
ed because it depends on public norms. The ISO procedures foresee the
possibility of a periodic review and revision of ISO 26000,271 yet this would
again place needed public resources at the convening "authority" of a pri-
vate actor. In the interim, the conflicts that erupt between the two spheres
could lead to confusion in applying local laws and regulations and unneces-
sary loss of economies in public enforcement.
The impact of the standard on society creates an additional question of
the integrity of the result in relation to its primary goal. Under the TBT
Agreement framework, applied directly or by analogy, ISO and other stand-
ards "can properly support and be used by public authorities" in the context
of commitments made under the TBT Code of Good Practice that standards
would not serve as unnecessary obstacles to international trade.27 2 In the ISO
26000 development process, it became clear that not all governments agreed
with one another on the policy positions or the relationship between interna-
tional and national law, both of which were being renegotiated in a private
forum. 73 They referenced the need to maintain the balance on policy auton-
omy struck in the TBT and Marrakesh Agreements in general, as well as the
CONFERENCE art. 5 (2010) (noting that credentials are verified by a Credentials Committee
and are subject to objections, complaints, and monitoring procedures established by the ILO's
General Conference). The ILO Constitution and Standing Orders can be found at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/leg/download/constitution.pdf.
270. ISO/IEC DIRECTIVES, supra note 77, foreword, §§ 1.1(b), 1.2.2, 2.5.5-.6; ISO PRO-
CEDURES SUPPLEMENT, supra note 80, §§ 1.8.1, 1.8.3.
271. ISO PROCEDURES SUPPLEMENT, supra note 80, § 2.9.3.2.
272. ISO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 1. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
273. These concerns resulted in the discord in the DIS vote. See Preliminary Voting
Result, supra note 139. For an excellent examination of the various objections of the Arab
states, Canada, China, India, and the United States, only some of which were resolved, see
Ward, supra note 137.
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GATT,274 which covered some of the ground being retilled in the substantive
core subjects declared to be part of the expectations of socially responsible
organizational behavior. In addition, by introducing the concept of "interna-
tional norms of behavior,' ' 27 5 ISO 26000 left a wide margin of discretion to
private actors in situations where national law conflicted or failed to give ef-
fect to international law. It declared that "an organization should respect
international norms of behavior, while adhering to the principle of respect
for the rule of law."27 6 The freedom left to private actors to interpret appro-
priately such a provision could prove problematic for compliance with
national law, particularly in dualist systems that do not automatically give
effect to international law. Indeed, the compromise wording in ISO 26000
begs the fundamental question that led to the decision to develop ISO 26000
in the first place: diversity at the national level was seen to give rise to
possibly conflicting orientations that needed to be urgently addressed;
277
nonetheless, the issues defy easy international standardization.
The difficulty presented by the ongoing effects of such a standard is
exemplified by the creation and dissolution of the "SR community," the
fundamental social unit convened to develop ISO 26000.278 The gathering
of "stakeholders" and "experts"-mixed as their status became-
assimilated a temporary society or community pronouncing expectations
related to socially agreed norms. The disbanding of the appointed "com-
munity" that created the standard demonstrated that, unlike the ongoing
social and legislative structures in the real world, or even in the traditional
ISO world of member bodies and technical experts, there was actually no
real and lasting community created to maintain the standard adopted or to
presumably express the values of society at large. 27 9 To the extent that im-
plementing ISO 26000 is now left to the NSBs in their promotional and
educational roles, it is for national governments to supervise and control
these bodies in the parallel processes set in motion based on the terms to
274. For policy autonomy, see, for example, TBT Agreement, supra note 140, art. 2.2;
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154; GATT, supra note 192, art. XX.
275. The definition of "international norms of behavior" consisted of "expectations of
socially responsible organizational behavior derived from customary international law,
generally accepted principles of international law, or intergovernmental agreements that are
universally or nearly universally recognized." WGSR DIS, supra note 134, § 2.1.10 (defining
international norms of behavior; the placement and wording unchanged in adopted standard).
276. ISO 26000, supra note 2, cl. 4.7.
277. The expectations of ISO 26000's benefits were set out in the NWIR See supra notes
35-39, 108, and accompanying text.
278. In contrast, in democratic public processes of lawmaking, the community and so-
ciety hold a primary role in determining what is of social value and what is of public interest.
See supra Part III.D.
279. Resolutions at the last meeting of the WGSR reflected hopes that NSBs would
maintain committees of experts at the national level based on the recommended multistake-
holder composition and balance, and especially do so through the first revision of the standard
(a five-year target). See 8th Meeting of the WGSR, supra note 69, Res. 8, 10.
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which these governments had not necessarily agreed in the first place.
Thus, the added value of the result produced is not evident, and the risks
attendant in its impact may justifiably cause concern and prompt regulato-
ry responses at national and international levels.
CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS:
COORDINATION AND A PROTOCOL OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR
STANDARDIZATION IN FIELDS RELATED TO PUBLIC POLICY
The shortcomings presented by the development of ISO 26000 do not
mean that private international standardization in support of public policy
and international legal norms cannot make a positive contribution. Rather,
the evidence suggests that such initiatives, on the one hand, and public ob-
jectives, on the other hand, will not automatically or even easily converge.
Perhaps some better form of complementarity could be envisaged to find a
common goal to be achieved in the interaction between the private standards
community and the public international community. This is the context of
the TBT Agreement, where the two spheres share a desire to facilitate inter-
national trade and to avoid unnecessary trade restrictions. Just as the TBT
Agreement and its TBT Code of Good Practice require commitments to be
taken by the private standardization actors within a greater framework of in-
ternational trade agreements, similar conmmitments should be required of
those actors within the framework of international social and human rights
law. The elements of such a framework derive from the fundamental interna-
tional legal principles supporting the rules of nondiscrimination, human
rights, political participation, development, and social progress. In this re-
gard, a Protocol of Good Practice could provide guidance for private
standardization in fields relating to public policy promoting a stricter
self-discipline by private standardization bodies in understanding when their
actions in such fields infringe on the rights and freedoms of others or do not
serve the general welfare.
A first step in developing concrete guidelines would be to recognize a
principle of coordination between public and private spheres that would give
preemptive effect to public law and policy, particularly international public
standards. This would be in some senses a mirror image of the principal
commitment of the TBT Agreement that public actors do not proceed with
standard setting when privately developed technical regulations exist or will
soon exist.280 The coordination principle would operate as a presumption or
evidentiary burden on private standardization bodies to guide the justifica-
tion of their decisions for standardization in certain fields where public
policy and legal action, particularly international public norms, are already
well established or imminent. This new coordination mechanism would
complement the existing basis for deference to private standardization bod-
280. TBT Agreement, supra note 140, art. 2.4.
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ies in technical fields under the TBT Agreement 28 ' by transposing the defer-
ence to public normative action in cases of standardization in public policy
fields, unless proven otherwise by preestablished criteria, including those
relevant to effectiveness and fairness. Such preestablished criteria might be
developed to determine which fields are already preempted by public regula-
tion and, in contrast, which fields (or relevant parts of fields) could be
subject to complementary action through international standardization, in
the form of subsidiary guidance, systems guidance, or technical or scientific
applications relevant to established fixed norms.282
The coordination presumption could operate not only at the initial stage
of selection of a field for international standardization, but also in the devel-
opment and subsequent operation of any such standard where justified. In
the development phase of a standard, its application would help to define the
appropriate scope of an exercise so that, where a public actor raises con-
cerns of mandate and content or procedure, deference would be given to the
concern unless otherwise justified by application of criteria to be verified by
an independent authority. Similarly, to encourage coherence in the operation
of such a standard, due deference would be given to the authority mandated
to interpret or apply a provision concerning the subject matter. The overall
effect could avoid draining public resources by using those resources for
processes that require public actors to appeal to private actors to act consist-
ently with the public mandate while, at the same time, encouraging
appropriate and effective multistakeholder initiatives to complement and
build on public regulatory processes where helpful.
Moving in the direction of coordination would mean at least that public
actors are not expected to fit into private structures where the main private
standardization inquiry concerns publicly established standards. Means for
encouraging a properly coordinated approach to governance would require
expanding existing international commitments that defer to private interna-
tional standards based on technical expertise, such as those in the TBT Code
of Good Practice. A further Protocol of Good Practice, for example, could
be developed to guide standardization bodies to accept international public
norms in their approach to standardization in fields relating to public poli-
cy.283 To cover the full breadth of ISO activities, such a Protocol would
281. Id.
282. The symbiosis between public law and private standardization is exemplified by the
creation of an interoperable biometric standard for the Seafarers' Identity Documents Conven-
tion (Revised), 2003 (No. 185), made possible through technical assistance from ISO
requested by ILO. See ILO, Report of the Director-General, Third Supplementary Report: Fol-
low-up to the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003 (No. 185), ILO Doc.
GB.306/17/3 (Nov. 2009).
283. The exercise involves adapting the TBT Code of Good Practice approach that seeks
to ensure that existing or imminent international private standards in the field of technical
regulation, whenever relevant, are used as a basis in developing any new standards and that
duplication and overlap with such relevant standards are avoided. See TBT Agreement, supra
note 140, Annex 3, §§ F, H. Further consideration could be given to building implementation
methods through reporting, notice and comment, and consultation procedures that would
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necessarily extend beyond the scope of the existing TBT framework, which
focuses only on product characteristics or their related PPMs, but not ser-
vices.
28 4
In a soft law approach, a model law or interpretative guidelines on the
role of private standardization in public policy areas could be developed for
use by states and their standards bodies, and by ISO and other private stand-
ardization organizations, as well as by the United Nations and other public
organizations. Such a structured interaction based on existing representative
systems, though not perfect, would support a model in which the conveyor
of policy and lawmaking in the public interest remains with the public body
and invites the standardization body to assist in the necessary technical ap-
plications.
The above types of approaches should leave intact the current system
that covers the vast majority of private standardization activity in which
public actors and ultimately the public good benefit from necessary tech-
nical expertise. The standards approved by recognized private bodies on the
basis of such expertise, which are already the subject of the TBT Agreement
and its annexed Code of Good Practice, do not require the lasting legitimacy
that comes from public representative and participatory structures and pro-
cesses.285 By preserving technical expertise as a valued and unique basis for
private action, standardization bodies may avoid competing in fields of pub-
lic policy with public authority based on authentic accreditation that
generates public international standards. When public standards are put into
question and even renegotiated in private standardization processes, the re-
sult risks undermining the effectiveness of action in both the public and
private spheres.
The strength of ISO lies in its worldwide network of NSBs that leverage
industry's global market. The strength of public international organizations
rests in their representative authority and processes. Governments in turn
have a responsibility to represent the democratic will of their people, a duty
that can be effectively only discharged in dialogue and coordination with the
private actors and organizations of the people. The challenge ahead is to
build an approach that will effectively coordinate the comparative ad-
vantages of both public and private actors at international and national
levels. Effectiveness will be measured in the end by the capacity to achieve
together the elimination of unnecessary barriers to trade and to promote de-
velopment, social progress, and human rights for all.
permit the necessary interaction between private standardizing bodies and public bodies con-
cerned. Cf id. §§ J, L-N.
284. Id. art. 1.3, Annex 1, [ 1-2 (noting that ISO defines the terms to "cover products,
processes and services," thus creating a broader scope than that used for the same terms in the
TBT Agreement).
285. See the discussion on representativity and procedures, supra Part III.A-B.
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